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INTRODUCTION
Law appears as a distinct social phenomenon not when we
have one man standing over another, but only when we have men
standing toward one another with rights and duties.'
In October 1992, Russia launched its mass privatization voucher
program, under which each Russian citizen received a stake in Russian
enterprises undergoing privatization. The program quickly created a
* Assistant Professor, The John Marshall Law School. J.D., Harvard University (1990).
Research for this article was funded with support from the U.S. State Department and The
John Marshall Law School.
1. Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of Marxian
Legal Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (1949) (restating the ideas of EUGENE
PASHUKANIS, GENERAL LEGAL THEORY AND MARXISM (3d ed. 1929)).
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country of an estimated 40 million shareholders2 and effected a transfer
of state property to private ownership on a magnitude comparable to
that of the reforms of Alexander II over one century ago.
Of course, formal conversion of certain ownership rights did not
complete Russia's conversion into a market economy. One underpinning
of a functioning market economy is meaningful protection of contract
and property rights. For example, a basic principle of contract law is
that a party who breaches a contract with another must pay damages to
make the injured party whole. Russian contract law adheres to this basic
principle.3 But it is arguably an open question whether Russia's court
system currently functions as a mechanism for effective contract en-
forcement, or whether the country's entrepreneurs rely on this mecha-
nism.
In 1991, the Russian government enacted legislation creating a
system of courts vested with the power to resolve economic disputes.
These courts were not created from scratch but were, instead, converted
from the existing Soviet system of economic courts, the system of state
arbitrazh. Simultaneous with the conversion of state arbitrazh in the
early 1990s was a spontaneous springing up of commercial arbitration
tribunals in the country, in particular tribunals affiliated with Russia's
developing network of commodities, currency and stock exchanges.
The most formidable constraints on Russia's dispute resolution
system relate to the legal chaos associated with the dismantling of the
Soviet system, corruption of the government and traditional views
towards courts and legality. These are all problems that of course defy
immediate correction and that affect government and society generally.
Yet, commercial arbitration is an attractive alternative to adjudication. It
is relatively free from association with the inefficiencies of the Soviet
2. A reported 40 million Russians were direct shareholders in Russian companies as of
June 1994, a figure that exceeds the number of U.S. shareholders both in absolute and relative
terms. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY: 1994 (1994), reprinted in
Russia's Securities Market, 5 E. EUR. REP. (BNA) 42, at 44 (Jan. 9, 1995).
3. Article 15 of Russia's Civil Code provides that (i) a person whose rights have been
violated may demand full indemnification and (ii) damages shall include restoration of the
violated right and any loss resulting therefrom, as well as loss of expected benefit. CHAST'
PERVAYA GRAZHDANSKOVO KODEKSA RossIISKOI FEDERATSII (PART I OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION], Nov. 30, 1994, Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii
(Sobr. Zakonod. RF], 1994, No. 32, item 3301, art. 15.
Part II of the Civil Code came into force in 1996. CHAST' VTORAYA GRAZHDANSKOVO
KODEKSA RossIsKOm FEDERATSIl [PART II OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-
TION], Jan. 26, 1996, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 5, item 410 [together with Part I, herein-
after CIVIL CODE]. Only Part I (containing general principles, property law and general
principles of tort and contract law) and Part II (containing specific principles of tort and
contract law) have been adopted to date.
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planned economy. The tendency in Russian business culture to attribute
greater value to the maintenance of a business contact than to the sancti-
ty of a legally enforceable contract would lead one to expect businesses
to opt for arbitration. Nonetheless, commercial arbitration is not yet
extensively utilized in Russia on the domestic level.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent transformation of
state arbitrazh into economic courts along with the development of
commercial arbitration in Russia, and to consider the relative utility of
these mechanisms for resolving disputes in Russia's evolving market
economy.4 Part I describes state arbitrazh and details its evolution into
the existing system of economic courts. Part II discusses the past and
recent development of commercial arbitration in Russia as an alternative
to litigating domestic disputes. Part III considers various social and
historic factors that hinder genuine reform.
I. EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC COURT SYSTEM
A. Soviet Era
Because Russia's system of economic courts5 was essentially created
out of the Soviet institution of state arbitrazh,6 one should understand
4. This paper proceeds from the premise that Russia's economy at least purports to be a
"market" economy. For support of this premise, see, e.g., ANDERS ASLUND, How RUSSIA
BECAME A MARKET ECONOMY (1995). The central thesis of Aslund's book is that, however
"messy and imperfect," Russia has already moved from a planned to a market economy. Id at 5.
The Heritage Foundation, on the other hand, concluded in 1995 that Russia did not have
a "free market economy." Peter Rutland, Russia Still Not a Free Market Economy, 2 OMRI
DAILY DIG. 17, (Jan. 12, 1996), available online <http://www.omri.cz/Publications/Digests/
9601/Digest.960112.html>. The Heritage Foundation report ranked Russia 100th on a list of
142 countries on the basis of a number of criteria, including the size of Russia's state sector
and the degree to which Russia affords legal protection for private property. Id.
5. The literal translation from the Russian for what is referred to herein as an "economic
court" is "arbitration court" [arbitrazhnyi sud]. The term "economic court" is used herein in
order to avoid confusion with the institution of commercial arbitration (which in Russian is
referred to as "treteiskii sud"). I believe that "economic court" is the more precise term, since
the successor to the institution of state arbitrazh in Russia is not a system of arbitration
tribunals, but is rather a system of courts vested with jurisdiction to resolve economic
disputes. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text. Although prior drafts of the legisla-
tion creating these courts used the term "economic court" (khoziaistvennyi sud), the final
legislation retained the Soviet-era reference to arbitrazh. See ARBITRAZHNYI PROTSESS:
UCHEBNIK DLIA Vuzov [ECONOMIC COURT PROCEDURE: TEXTBOOK FOR UNIVERSITIES] 6 (M.
Treushnikov ed., 1995) [hereinafter Treushnikov].
6. Although it is possible to conceive of the reforms as creating a new system of
economic courts rather than reforming the existing Soviet institution of state arbitrazh, this
process is generally described as one of transforming state arbitrazh into a system of Russian
economic courts. See, e.g., Venyamin Iakovlev & Mikhail Iukov, Novoe v Deiatel'nosti
Arbitrazhnykh Sudov [News on the Activity of Economic Courts], ZAKON, 1995, No. 9, at 52,
53 (describing the Procedure Code as "completing the transformation of former state
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certain fundamental principles of Soviet economic law as well as the
historic purpose and function of state arbitrazh in the Soviet planned
economy.7
Olympiad Ioffe maintains that the basic characteristics that underlay
the Soviet economy were state ownership of economic resources and the
separation of ownership from production.8 Although Soviet enterprises
utilized property in order to produce goods and services, as a matter of
Soviet law this property was solely owned by the state. 9 The purpose of
state planning, therefore, was to mitigate the Soviet government's loss
of control over economic resources utilized by enterprises.'0 Whereas
planning was the mechanism utilized to maintain centralized state con-
trol over economic resources, the decentralizing mechanism utilized by
Soviet enterprises to transact with each other was the institution of
contract."1
State arbitrazh was created by government decree 12 in 1931 as a
system of special economic tribunals whose primary role was to super-
vise contracts entered into between state enterprises. The use of the term
arbitrazh" into economic courts); Yuri Severin, Treteiskii sud-Tozhe Instrument Rynka
[Arbitration is also a Market Mechanism], ZAKON, 1994, No. 2, at 27 (referring to the
"transformation" of state arbitrazh).
Treushnikov describes the reform process as follows: "The resolution of disputes
between economic actors using the means and methods that were utilized under the conditions
of the administrative-command system of arbitrazh became impossible. Therefore arbitrazh
was transformed into a system of courts .... Treushnikov, supra note 5, at 9.
7. For descriptions of the Soviet institution of state arbitrazh, see Harold J. Berman,
Commercial Contracts in Soviet Law, 35 CAL. L. REV. 191, 204-09 (1947) [hereinafter
Berman, Commercial Contracts]; HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTER-
PRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 124-44 (rev. ed. 1963) [hereinafter BERMAN, JUSTICE]; Stanislaw
Pomorski, State Arbitrazh in the U.S.S.R.: Development, Functions, Organization, 9 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 61 (1977). For an excellent explanation of the relationship between plan and
contract in the Soviet economy, see Olympiad S. loffe, Law and Economy in the U.S.S.R., 95
HARV. L. REV. 1591 (1982).
8. loffe, supra note 7, at 1595.
9. Ioffe, supra note 7, at 1595 n.9. (citing KONSTITUTSnA (OSNOVNOI ZAKON) SOIUZA
SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK [KONST. SSSR] [CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMEN-
TAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS] art. 11 (1977)).
10. loffe, supra note 7, at 1598.
11. Id. at 1609.
12. Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 7, at 204 n.44 (citing Decree of March
20, 1931, On Changes in the System of Credit, the Strengthening of the Credit Reform, and
the Securing of Business Accountability, COLL. LAWS, U.S.S.R. (1931), No. 18, art. 166).
State arbitrazh had jurisdiction over inter-ministry disputes (e.g., a contract dispute
between enterprises belonging to different ministries). A separate institution known as
departmental arbitrazh resolved disputes arising within the same ministry. BERMAN, JUSTICE,
supra note 7, at 124. The difference between the two was in the lines of administrative au-
thority under which each institution was subordinate: whereas state arbitrazh was ultimately
accountable to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, departmental arbitrazh was accountable to
the ministry to which it belonged. Id. at 124.
[Vol. 18:59
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"arbitrazh" to describe these tribunals is misleading in two respects.
First, as Harold Berman has noted,13 arbitrazh bore little resemblance to
arbitration in that its jurisdiction was compulsory and state arbitrators
generally were required to apply and adhere to legal rules. In addition,
although the functioning of state arbitrazh as a resolver of contract
disputes in some respects was similar to that of a court or arbitration
tribunal in the West, the status of contract in Soviet economic law was
ultimately subordinate to and legally dependent upon the plan. Thus,
state arbitrazh as the adjudicator of contracts in the Soviet economy was
not independent of the government bureaucracy; rather, it was an exten-
sion of the administrative apparatus.
The formal rules of Soviet contract law illustrate this relationship.
First, any contract entered into independent of or inconsistent with a
plan was invalid.14 Similarly, parties were under an affirmative legal
obligation to conclude a contract provided for in a plan.'" Thus Soviet
enterprises were not free to alter the terms of an agreement entered into
under a plan, or to rescind such agreement. The role of arbitrazh in
these cases ultimately was to ensure that contracts were performed in
accordance with the plan. Although enterprises were under an affirma-
tive legal obligation to bring suit to enforce violations of a contract, 6
arbitrazh was also empowered to bring proceedings on its own initia-
tive, without any action on the part of the parties to a contract.17
Since the function of arbitrazh as a resolver of disputes was ulti-
13. BERMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 124. See also Pomorski, supra note 7, at 61.
14. Heidi Kroll, Breach of Contract in the Soviet Economy, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 122
n. 11 (1987) (citing Statute on the Deliveries of Consumer Goods, art. 98 (1981)); id. at 123
n.13 (citing Statute on the Deliveries of Producer Goods, art. 11 (1981)) [hereinafter Statute
on Deliveries]. See also Pomorski, supra note 7, at 68.
Related to article 11 is the Soviet-era rule limiting the legal capacity of Soviet enterpris-
es. To illustrate, loffe gives the example of a case involving a research institute that was
bound by planned contract to design a model for new equipment. In order to utilize idle plant
capacity, the institute entered into an additional contract (not planned) for the production and
sale of a number of sets of the equipment to a customer. When a dispute later arose involving
alleged defects in the equipment, the customer brought suit. Arbitrazh declared the contract
void, since the institute was only authorized to design, not produce, equipment. Toffe, supra
note 7, at 1608 n.33.
Although contracts were subordinate to the plan, there was some scope for contract to
contribute to the planning process. In particular, where a plan was worded generally, contracts
allowed enterprises to provide the detail necessary to effectively implement the plan.
Pomorski, supra note 7, at 69. Thus, the less specific the plan, the greater the role that
contract could play and, thus, the greater the degree of economic decentralization. loffe, supra
note 7, at 1613.
15. loffe, supra note 7, at 1613 n.42 (stating that arbitrazh could force an enterprise to
execute any contract to which a plan designated it as a party).
16. Id. at 1607, n.32 (citing the Statute on Deliveries of Goods for Technical-Production
Use, art. 101(7)).
17. Pomorski, supra note 7, at 81.
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mately subordinate to its role in enforcing the plan, resort to arbitrazh
was an imperfect and limited solution to the problems that repeatedly
arose in the Soviet planned economy. An anecdote that typifies the
sometimes ridiculous anomalies resulting from central planning and the
limitations of arbitrazh in remedying them was recounted by Louise
Shelley, who conducted a series of interviews during the 1980s with
Soviet emigre lawyers and state arbitrators." The anecdote, recounted to
her by a former arbitrator, involved a bread factory and a neighboring
food distributor. The parties entered into a contract for the delivery of
flour to the bread factory, which was to be sent in sacks via a conveyor
belt that linked the two enterprises. The contract obligated the bread
factory to return the empty sacks. However, the conveyor belt only
worked in one direction, and the ministry refused to grant permission
for the bread factory to purchase a truck. The bread factory had no
option but to utilize a small horse that could only deliver the sacks in
small batches. The arbitrator was forced to impose huge fines on the
bread factory for failure to return the sacks, payments that would have
been sufficient to purchase several trucks. In this case, the role of
arbitrazh was limited to enforcing the delivery contract; it could not as
a legal matter remedy or alleviate the concerns of the bread factory by
intervening with the relevant ministry or excusing performance. 9 Not
surprisingly, Shelley found that the most significant disadvantage to
arbitrators' work was the "perceived futility" of their decisions.20
As the Soviet political and economic system disintegrated during the
late 1980s21 and Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of glasnost' unleashed
public opinion, criticism was levelled at arbitrazh for its inability to
protect enterprises against the failings of the economy.22 Although as a
formal matter one of the primary functions of arbitrazh was to "guaran-
tee the defense of rights and legal interests of enterprises" during the
18. LouiSE I. SHELLEY, LAWYERS IN SOVIET WORK LIFE 75 (1984).
19. The limitations of the formal system were commonly subverted, however, by
enterprises that would bypass arbitrazh and resort to informal mechanisms of dispute resolu-
tion. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
20. SHELLEY, supra note 18, at 51.
21. As Anders Aslund points out, perestroika succeeded in tearing down the Soviet
system without building anything to take its place. ASLUND, supra note 4, at 51.
22. R. Kallistratova cites the example of the general director of the enterprise
"Pskovmash," who complained of arbitrazh's failure to compel the purchase of a very
expensive machine that Pskovmash had been ordered to produce and no enterprise was
willing to buy: "When I went to state arbitrazh, it turned out that these sorts of issues were
not handled there. Who, then, will protect directors from unlawful action?" R.F. Kallistratova,
Perestroika i Budushchee Arbitrazha [Perestroika and the Future of Arbitrazh], SOVETSKOE
GosuDARSTVO I PRAvo [Sov. Gos. ! PRAvo], 1989, No. 5, at 36.
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process of perestroika,23 it was apparent that the institution was unable
to fulfill this task. Since arbitrazh was essentially a part of the bureau-
cratic system, it could not realisticially be expected to protect the inter-
ests of enterprises when these interests were at odds with the expressed
priorities of the state.24
During the period preceding the break-up of the Soviet Union, at
least two proposals were discussed in connection with reforming and
restructuring the institution of state arbitrazh into an independent,
market-oriented institution. One proposal was to convert state arbitrazh
into an economic court that would have jurisdiction to resolve all com-
mercial disputes, whether of a civil or administrative nature.25 Another
was to reform arbitrazh but limit the new institution's role to handling
administrative disputes, transferring jurisdiction over other commercial
disputes to courts of general jurisdiction.26 As is discussed below, the
legislation that was ultimately adopted took the first approach.27 Any
meaningful reform of state arbitrazh in Russia could only take effect,
however, after the formal dismantling of the Soviet planned economy,
which was implemented only when Russia achieved independence.
B. Post-Soviet Era
The legislation that founded Russia's modem system of economic
courts was enacted by the Russian government in July 1991, just months
23. Kallistratova, supra note 22, at 37 (citing Polozhenie 0 Gosudarstvennom Arbitrazhe
SSSR [Regulation on USSR State Arbitrazh], Apr. 16, 1988, Sobr. Polozhenia SSSR, 1988,
No. 19-20, item 59, art. 2).
24. Russian legal scholars made this argument during the years leading up to the reform
of state arbitrazh. See I. Avilina, Mekhaniszmy Zashchity Khoziaistvennykh Pray [Mechanisms
for the Protection of Economic Rights], NARODNYi DEPUTAT, 1991, No. 1, at 71;
Kallistratova, supra note 22, at 40. Even if an arbitrator did act independent of the govern-
ment plan, it was unlikely that such a decision would ultimately be enforced. Kallistratova,
supra note 22, at 40.
25. For a discussion of what constitutes a "civil" versus an "administrative" dispute, see
infra note 37.
26. See, e.g., Avilina, supra note 24, at 71; Kallistratova, supra note 22, at 43.
27. See infra Part I.B.1. It appears from Soviet legislation enacted just prior to the break-
up of the country that the Russian reformers simply followed the approach taken by the
Soviet government. In May 1991, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a law establishing a
Supreme Economic Court, which was to replace state arbitrazh and was to be vested withjurisdiction to resolve both administrative and civil economic disputes between organizations
and enterprises. See A. Arifulin, Novye Zakony o Vysshem Arbitrazhnom Sude SSSR [New
Law on USSR Supreme Arbitration Court], Vestnik Verkhovnovo Suda SSSR [Vest. Verkh.
Suda SSSR], 1991, No. 9, at 22 (citing Zakon SSSR 0 Poriadke Razreshenia
Khoziaistvennykh Sporov Vysshym Arbitrazhnym Sudom'SSSR [USSR Law on the Order for
Resolving Economic Disputes by the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court], adopted by the
USSR Supreme Soviet on May 17, 1991).
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prior to the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.28
A revised law on economic courts was enacted in 1995,29 introducing
extensive revisions, but not reversing the direction of reform of state
arbitrazh that began with the 1991 legislation. The legislation creating
economic courts was accompanied by the adoption of a code of eco-
nomic court procedure.30 This section defines the jurisdiction of the new
economic courts and considers the extent to which the courts' role has
been redefined in light of the profound ideological shift of Russian
commercial law in recent years.
1. Jurisdiction
In terms of the overall framework of Russia's court system, the
Russian Constitution provides for three types of courts: courts of general
jurisdiction (of which the Supreme Court is the highest judicial body),3'
economic courts (of which the Supreme Arbitration Court [vyshyi
arbitrazhni sud]32 is the highest judicial body), 33 and a Constitutional
Court.34 The Constitution and Russian legislation define the jurisdiction
of the economic courts vis-A-vis other courts. In general, economic
courts have jurisdiction to entertain actions of companies and entrepre-
neurs. However, suits challenging the validity of legislation, although
"economic," are outside economic court jurisdiction. Although the
Procedure Code empowers economic courts to review the validity of
certain administrative acts (such as the decision of the state property
28. Zakon RSFSR Ob Arbitrazhnom Sude [RSFSR Law on Arbitration Courts], July 4,
1991, Vedomosti S'ezda Narodnih Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnovo Soveta RSFSR
[Vedomosti RSFSR], 1991, No. 20, item 1013 [hereinafter 1991 Act].
29. Zakon Ob Arbitrazhnikh Sudakh v Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Law on Arbitration Courts
in the Russian Federation], May 5, 1995, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 18, item 1589
[hereinafter Economic Court Act].
30. The first Russian code of economic court procedure was enacted in 1992.
ARBITRAZHNYI PROTSESSUAL'NYI KODEKS RoSSIISKoI FEDERATSII [APK RF] [CODE OF
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION], Apr. 16, 1992, Vedomosti RSFSR,
1992, No. 16, item 836, translated in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RUSLEG file [hereinafter 1992
CODE].
As with the Economic Court Act, the procedure code was revised in 1995. APK RF,
May 5, 1995, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 19, item 1709 [hereinafter PROCEDURE CODE].
For an analysis of the provisions of the Economic Court Act and the Procedure Code,
see Vratislav Pechota, Survey of East European Law: Russia Overhauls the System of
Arbitration Courts, 2 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 239 (1995).
31. KONSTITUTSIA RossnsKoI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION] art. 126 (1993).
32. Hereinafter Supreme Economic Court.
33. KONST. RF, art. 127 (1993).
34. KONST. RF, art. 125 (1993).
[Vol. 18:59
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committee to approve the privatization plan of an enterprise), if a disput-
ed act of government is of a normative (i.e., law-making) character
(such as the issuance by the state property committee of privatization
regulations), then the proper court to review the validity of such an act
would be the Constitutional Court or a court of general jurisdiction.
As to defining the jurisdiction between economic courts and courts
of general jurisdiction, recall that in reforming the institution of
arbitrazh, the reformers opted to vest the new courts with jurisdiction to
resolve all "economic disputes" [ekonomicheskie spori], thus retaining
the historic nature of state arbitrazh as a sort of economic court.36 The
reformers thus rejected the approach of limiting the jurisdiction of
arbitrazh to administrative disputes and delegating jurisdiction over civil
disputes to courts of general jurisdiction.37
By creating a special system of "economic" courts, Russia is to a
certain extent following the example of a number of other European
countries, such as France and Germany, that utilize specialized courts
that handle commercial matters.38 And in a sense, Russia chose an
35. Procedure Code, Article 22(2) provides that economic courts have jurisdiction,
among other things, to declare invalid any "non-normative" act of government. PROCEDURE
CODE, supra note 30, art. 22(2). See also Treushnikov, supra note 5, at 100.
As to the constitutionality of a normative act of government, Article 125 of the Russian
Constitution vests jurisdiction to resolve this issue with the Constitutional Court. KoNST. RF,
art. 125(2) (1993).
36. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art. 22(1). The Plenum of the RF Supreme Court
and the Plenum of the Supreme Economic Court issued a joint ruling to provide guidance on
the question of jurisdiction between economic courts and courts of general jurisdiction. See
E.A. VINOGRADOVA, TRETEISKII SUD v Rossl [ARBITRATION IN RUSSIA] 29 (1993) (citing
Postanovlenie No. 12/12 Plenuma Verkhovnovo Suda RF i Plenuma Vyishevo Arbitrazhnovo
Suda RF 0 Nekotorykh Voprosakh Podvedomstvennosti Del Sudam i Arbitrazhnym Sudam
[On Several Jurisdictional Questions of Courts and Arbitration Courts], Vestnik Vyshevo
Arbitrazhnovo Suda RF [Vestn. Vysh. Arb. Suda RF], 1992, No. 1, at 84).
37. As to defining what constitutes an "administrative" versus a "civil" dispute, a study
issued by the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral organizations referred to
administrative disputes as those arising out of economic relationships of a "planned," as
opposed to a "voluntary," nature. 2 INT'L MONETARY FUND et al., A STUDY OF THE SOVIET
ECONOMY 253 (1991). The IMF study cited above analyzed early drafts of Soviet-level reform
legislation that most likely formed the basis for the Russian Economic Court Act. See
Arifulin, supra note 27.
38. The French tribunaux de commerce, for example, are specialized commercial courts
that adjudicate business disputes and commercial transactions such as bankruptcy. The
Germans also utilize specialized commercial courts. Unlike Russia's new economic courts,
however, the commercial courts in Germany and France are presided over by lay judges that
possess specialized knowledge of business and commerce. See, e.g., John Bell, Principles and
Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757, 1762 (1988); David Clark,
The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a
Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1829-31 (1988).
During and after the reform of arbitrazh, Russian jurists looked to the experience of
other European countries as precedent for the Russian approach. See Iakovlev and Iukov,
supra note 6, at 54 (citing Germany, France and Great Britain as countries with economic
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approach that has roots in its own pre-Revolutionary history.39 Prior to
1917, there existed four special courts in what was then Russia (in
Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Odessa and Warsaw), each vested with
jurisdiction to resolve commercial disputes. 4° All but the court in War-
saw operated independently of the legal system and were governed by
special rules of commercial procedure.4 In contrast to the current courts,
the make-up of the pre-Revolutionary commercial courts was unique:
some of the judges were designated by the government, whereas the
others were experienced merchants chosen for the court by the local
merchant association. 42 Another significant difference between the pre-
Revolutionary commercial courts and Russia's current economic courts
is that the present-day courts handle both administrative and commercial
disputes, whereas the pre-Revolutionary courts only handled commercial
disputes. 43 In terms of jurisdiction, therefore, the present-day economic
courts are something of a cross between Soviet state arbitrazh
(which-by virtue of the planned economy-had jurisdiction over dis-
putes that were essentially administrative) and the pre-Revolutionary
commercial courts.
A survey of the published opinions issued by the Plenum' of the
Supreme Economic Court during the twelve-month period between May
1994 and May 1995 demonstrates that a substantial portion of the
caseload of the present-day economic courts has been devoted to ad-
dressing administrative disputes, particularly in the area of privatiza-
tion.41 Of the forty-one opinions reviewed, twenty-seven of them, or
courts); Kallistratova, supra note 22, at 42 (suggesting that the Soviet Union might adopt the
approach of Hungary and former Yugoslavia as transition economies that had set up economic
courts).
39. Iakovlev and Iukov, supra note 6, at 54.
40. E.V. VAS'KOVSKII, UCHEBNIK GRAZHDANSKOVO PROTSESSA [MANUAL OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE] 419 (1917). The first of these courts was set up by the local authorities in
Odessa upon the petition of foreign merchants who lived there. Id. at 420.
41. Id. at 419.
42. Id. at 420.
43. The pre-Revolutionary commercial courts were vested with jurisdiction to handle
three types of disputes: (i) most commercial disputes (with a few exceptions such as small
claims), (ii) disputes involving bills of exchange [veksel']; and (iii) bankruptcy. Id. at 131-32.
Special judicial-administrative tribunals [sudebno-administrativnyia uchrezhdenia] handled
administrative disputes. Id. at 40.
44. Until the 1995 reforms to the Economic Court Act, the Plenum was the supreme
reviewing body of decisions rendered by economic courts. Under the 1995 reforms, that
function was transferred to a new body, the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Court. See
infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the review process.
45. These opinions are published in RossIISKAYA IUSTITSIIA [Ross. lUST.], No. 10, (1994)
and Nos. 1-3, 6, 9-10 (1995).
A dispute was characterized "administrative" if the complaint challenged the validity of
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roughly two-thirds of the opinions, were administrative. Fifteen of the
administrative cases involved privatization or lease [arenda] transac-
tions.46 Of the fourteen civil suits, one involved enforcement of an
arbitration decision47 and ten involved credit agreements or insurance
contracts against debtor default. Although the cases reviewed may not
be entirely representative of the types of disputes brought to economic
courts, the figures indicate that (i) at least during the period surveyed,
economic courts have functioned more as administrative than commer-
cial courts, and (ii) the commercial disputes that have been brought to
economic courts commonly have sought to enforce a promise to make
payment.48
Although the jurisdiction of the economic courts is broad in the
sense that it covers both administrative and civil disputes, it is limited to
"economic" [ekonomicheskie] disputes as defined by the Procedure
Code. Generally speaking, economic court jurisdiction exists only where
each party to the dispute (or, if the suit is brought against a government
body, the plaintiff) is either an organization or a person officially regis-
tered with the government as an entrepreneur.49 If a party to a given
an act of government or governmental agency. However, determining whether a particular
dispute involved administrative or civil relations was not always clear-cut. Two of the cases
that are classified as administrative involved banks challenging acts of the Central Bank as
administrator of the banking system. Another case involving a construction contract was
classified as administrative since the dispute arose over whether a subdivision of the Rostov
regional administration of Promstroibank had authority to conclude the contract. For an exact
breakdown of the cases reviewed, see Appendix.
46. President Gorbachev issued legislation in 1989 which made possible an early form of
privatizing state-owned property by concluding a long-term contract for lease [arenda]. 2
ROMAN FRYDMAN ET AL., THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE
BALTIC STATES 20-21 (CEU Privatization Reports, 1993). See also, E. A. Suhanov, Privatiza-
tion in the Soviet Union and Various Forms of Property Accompanying the Transition to a
Market Economy, in PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 73 (Petar ar~evi6
ed., 1992) (citing "Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics on
Leasing," Vedomosti S'ezda Narodnih Deputatov SSSR i Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR
[Vedomosti SSSR], 1989, No. 25, item 481). By early 1992, the number of enterprises that
had been leased in this manner had reached 9,451. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra at 22.
47. As discussed below, decisions issued by domestic arbitration tribunals are enforce-
able by application to the economic court having jurisdiction over the territory where the
arbitration tribunal is located. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
48. Resorting to litigation in economic court (as opposed to commercial arbitration) in
these types of cases may be motivated by the economic court's relatively broad formal
powers to enforce judgment, e.g., by ordering Russian banks to apply any funds in defen-
dant's accounts to satisfy judgment. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
49. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art. 22(1). Article 23 of the Civil Code authorizes
registered individuals to engage in entrepreneurial activity. CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, art.
23(1). For a discussion of the procedure for registration, see Treushnikov, supra note 5, at 56
(citing RSFSR Zakon 0 Registratsionom Sbore s Fizicheskikh Lits, Zanimaiushchikhsia
Predprinimatel'skoi Deiatel'nost'iu, i Poriadke ikh Registratsii [On the Registration Duty of
Physical Persons Engaged in Entrepreneurial Activity and Registration Procedure], Dec. 7,
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action is neither an organization nor a registered entrepreneur, then the
proper court to review the dispute is a court of general jurisdiction. In
addition, even if both parties to a dispute are organizations or entrepre-
neurs, the subject matter of the dispute must be "economic" in order to
confer economic court jurisdiction.50 For example, disputes involving
housing or labor relations would be handled by a court of general
jurisdiction regardless of the status of the parties.5'
2. Role of Economic Courts
As Russia's economy underwent fundamental change during and
after perestroika, the need to redefine and recreate state arbitrazh in
response to this economic change became obvious.52 To a certain extent,
the Economic Court Act and the Procedure Code successfully redefine
Soviet state arbitrazh. Now that the economy has moved from plan to
market, economic courts are no longer an extension of the administrative
apparatus but are politically independent institutions whose formal role
is to protect the legal rights and interests of citizens. These principles
are enshrined in the Russian Constitution, which guarantees the indepen-
dence, 53 life tenure 54 and immunity55 of judges, as well as a public
judicial process 56 and the financial independence of courts from local
administration.57
1991, Vedomosti S'ezda Narodnikh Deputatov RF i Verkhovnovo Soveta RF [Vedomosti
RF, 1992, No. 8, item 360).
So long as the jurisdictional requirements are otherwise met, economic courts also may
resolve economic disputes where one or both parties to the dispute is foreign or is an organi-
zation with foreign investment. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art. 22(6).
50. Article 22 of the Procedure Code does not define the term "economic," but provides
a nonexclusive list of what constitutes an economic dispute, including any contract dispute,
property dispute, request to declare invalid any non-normative act of government, or dispute
arising out of bankruptcy. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art. 22(2). In addition, economic
court jurisdiction may be conferred by agreement of the parties. Id.
Economic courts also have sole jurisdiction to enforce the domestic decisions of com-
mercial arbitration tribunals. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
51. See Treushnikov, supra note 5, at 55.
52. A judge in Saint Petersburg recalls how state arbiters "suffocated" under the weight
of economic cases that were brought to arbitrazh prior to the institution's reform. Karl
Rendel, Okruzhnye Arbitrazhnye Sudi-Tol'ko vo Blago [Regional Economic Courts-Only
for Good], ZAKON, 1995, No. 9, at 58 (interview with Saint Petersburg Economic Court Judge
Liudmila Batalova). See also Avilina, supra note 24, at 71 (pointing out the futility of
limiting the reform of state arbitrazh to "minor repairs" [nebol'shoi remont]).
53. KONST. RF, art. 120 (1993).
54. KONST. RF, art. 121 (1993).
55. KONST. RF, art. 122 (1993).
56. KONST. RF, art. 123 (1993).
57. KONST. RF, art. 124 (1993). The Russian government also adopted legislation that
details and expands upon the basic protection for judges provided for in the Constitution. See
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Act provides that economic court activity shall proceed on the basis of
the principles discussed above, plus an additional principle: the primacy
of the adversary process.6 Organizing economic court activity on' the
basis of the adversary process requires economic court proceedings to be
driven not by the initiative of the judge but by that of the parties. This
orientation is a significant departure from the role that state arbitrazh
played in the past. In describing arbitrazh procedure during the Soviet
era, Berman has compared the function of the Soviet state arbitrator to
that of a bankruptcy judge in the United States legal system, where the
"judge-referee often makes his own 'preliminary investigation' of the
case, consulting personally in advance with the various parties .in-
volved," although the formal hearing is governed by procedural rules.65
In other words, in the past Soviet state arbitrators played an active, and
somewhat paternal, 66 role in the cases they adjudicated.
Although the importance of the adversary process is espoused in
principle in the reform legislation, one suspects that economic court
judges still take a relatively active and paternal approach to adjudicating
disputes. For example, the chief judge of the Supreme Economic Court,
while acknowledging the importance of allowing parties to control
adjudication through the adversary process, also believes there is a need
to "strengthen" active participation by judges in this process in order to
protect the fairness of court decisions, particularly where there is a
patent discrepancy in wealth between the parties to a dispute.67
Even on a formal level, however, certain provisions of the Economic
Court Act and the Procedure Code perpetuate the traditional role of
arbitrazh as a regulator that actively participates in the adjudication
process. In contrast to the principles of judicial independence and adver-
sary process articulated in Article 6 of Economic Court Act, Article 5
describes the role of economic courts as "strengthening legality and
preventing unlawful acts" in the economic sphere.68 Thus Article 5
articulates a supervisory role for the court that is somewhat at odds with
notions of an adversarial process and party autonomy, particularly in the
context of adjudicating commercial contract disputes.
64. Article 6 of the Act states that economic court activity shall be based upon legality,
independence of judges, equality of persons before the law and the court, the adversary
process, equality of parties and openness.in the adjudication of cases. Economic Court Act,
supra note 29, art. 6. See also PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art. 7 (stating that economic
court procedure shall proceed on the basis of party equality and the adversary process).
65. BERMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 310-11.
66. Id.
67. Iakovlev and Iukov, supra note 6, at 54.
68. Economic Court Act, supra note 29, art. 5.
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The shift from plan to market also is reflected in Russia's new Civil
Code,5 the fundamental legislation governing economic relations in the
country. Article 1 includes in the list of the basic principles of civil
legislation the notion of freedom of contract.59 In addition, Article 421
expressly provides that parties shall be free in concluding contracts and
prohibits coercion to conclude an agreement. 60 Russian companies,
therefore, are no longer under an affirmative obligation to enter into
planned contracts. As to legal capacity, which under the Soviet planned
economy operated to restrict severely an enterprise's permitted activi-
ties,61 the Civil Code now allows a company to engage in any legal
activity permitted in its founding documents. 62 More generally, in con-
trast to the Soviet era, the contract law principles set forth in the Civil
Code are predominantly dispositive norms.63 The courts' implicit role in
this new legal regime, therefore, is not to police the compulsory execu-
tion and implementation of contracts but rather to enforce contracts
entered into freely.
As to the legislation reforming state arbitrazh, the Economic Court
Zakon 0 Statuse Sud'ei v Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Law on the Status of Judges in the Russian
Federation], June 26, 1992, Vedomosti RF, 1992, No. 30, item 1792 [hereinafter Law on
Judges]. The Law on Judges was extensively amended in 1995. See Zakon 0 Vnesenii
Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii '0 Statuse Sud'ei v Rossiiskoi
Federatsii' [Law on Amending and Supplementing the Russian Federation Law on the Status
of Judges in the Russian Federation], June 21, 1995, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 26, item
2399 [hereinafter Law Amending Status of Judges].
For an analysis of the Law on Judges prior to the 1995 reforms, see Mikhail S. Paleev,
The Establishment of an Independent Judiciary in Russia, 1 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 647,
651 (1994). See also John Quigley, Law Reform and the Soviet Courts, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 59 (1990).
58. CIVIL CODE, supra note 3. For a comparative discussion of Part I of the Civil Code
and civil law principles under Soviet law, see Iakov Shestopal, Potentsial Grazhdanskovo
Prava i Sudi [The Potential of Civil Law and the Courts], ZAKON, 1995, No. 5, at 86 (inter-
view with Venyamin Iakovlev, Chief Judge of Russia's Supreme Economic Court). See also
E. Sukhanov, Russia's New Civil Code, 1 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 619, 635 (1994).
59. CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
60. Id. art. 421; Shestopal, supra note 58, at 89. See also CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, art.
450 (allowing parties to amend or rescind a contract by agreement).
61. See the anecdote cited supra at note 14. The enterprise at issue was not able to
produce the specialized equipment because it did not have legal capacity to do so.
62. CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, art. 49. See also id. art. 22(1) (principle of unrestricted
legal capacity of individuals). Changes in the concept of legal capacity under the new Civil
Code are discussed in Shestopal, supra note 58, at 90.
In addition, Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that only civil legislation shall regulate
legal relations arising from entrepreneurial activity. CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, art. 2(1). The
Civil Code therefore refutes the notion that "economic" law, or the law governing entrepre-
neurial activity, is a body of law separate from civil law. In the past this distinction provided
a rationalization for state interference in economic activity. Sukhanov, supra note 58, at 635.
63. Dispositive norms refer to background rules that apply unless the parties agree
otherwise. Shestopal, supra note 58, at 90.
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instance for party appeal. Whereas previously, the economic court
system included courts of first instance and the Supreme Economic
Court, the 1995 reforms provide for the addition of ten regional courts
with jurisdiction to conduct cassation review on issues of law.7 9 In
providing for independent cassation review and by narrowing the scope
of supervisory review, the system has in large part moved away from
the Soviet administrative-bureaucratic economy and towards judicial
independence and party autonomy in contractual relations.
The reforms have also narrowed, but not eliminated, the scope for
government involvement in the adjudication of economic disputes. First,
the Economic Court Act allows for persons other than judges to partici-
pate in sessions of the Presidium, including the Procurator General and
(by invitation) the Minister of Justice, judges of other courts or "other
persons. 's° In other words, the Act allows government officials to partic-
ipate in the supervisory review of economic court cases. Second, the
Procedure Code empowers the Procuracy to submit complaints to an
economic court "in the protection of governmental and societal inter-
ests, and to apply for appellate and cassation review of any complaint
that it has submitted at first instance.82 The law does not prohibit, for
example, a local procurator from bringing an action in the interests of
"society" to enforce a breach of contract entered into between two
businesses.8 3 The 1995 amendments to the Procedure Code, however,
79. Economic Court Act, supra note 29, arts. 24, 26 (outlining the jurisdiction and role
of each of the ten new regional courts); PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, arts. 161-62
(providing for the right of a party to appeal a decision to a regional court for cassation
review) and art. 176(1) (limiting the basis for reversing or remanding decisions to issues of
law). For a discussion of the historic significance of the new regional courts, see Prebavitsia
li Nizavicimosti Arbitrazhnomu Sudu? [Will the Independence of Arbitration Courts In-
crease?], ZAKON, 1995, No. 9, at 3.
80. Economic Court Act, supra note 29, art. 15(3).
81. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art. 41(1). In fact, the Procedure Code extends this
power to other government officials as well. Id. art. 42.
82. Id. art. 41(3) (allowing a procurator who submits a complaint to exercise the rights to
which a party is entitled); Treushnikov, supra note 5, at 255, 280.
83. Of the Supreme Arbitration Court cases published in 1994-95 (see Appendix),
however, the four actions that were brought by the Procuracy were all complaints challenging
the validity of administrative acts.
When a member of the Procuracy was recently asked what is meant by "governmental
and societal interests," he responded by listing the following concerns: (i) the failure of
registered founding documents of organizations to comply with legal requirements; (ii)
economic activity engaged in without the requisite permission or license; (iii) violations of
environmental legislation; and (iv) the failure to comply with obligations, where such failure
might disrupt significant investment projects or other programs of governmental importance.
Viktor Pecherskii, Procuror v Arbitrazhnom Protsesse [Procurators in the Economic Court
Process], ZAKON, 1995, No. 9, at 75, 76 (interview with Alexandr Karlinyi).
In 1994, the Procuracy submitted 2,383 complaints for the protection of governmental
and societal interests, seeking aggregate damages in the amount of 1.3 trillion rubles. Id. A
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have added a limitation to this power: if the party in whose interests the
complaint is submitted (in the example above, the injured party to the
contract) rejects the complaint, then the court will not review the dis-
pute. 4 The Procedure Code now allows party autonomy to trump the
power of the government to intervene in the resolution of private eco-
nomic disputes.
As to the role of the Procuracy in Russian civil practice, it should
be noted that plaintiffs often welcome the participation of the Procuracy
in civil and administrative disputes, especially in light of the fact that a
Procurator's involvement in a suit allows the injured party a vehicle for
bringing an action without paying court fees." In practice, complaints
submitted by the Procuracy are typically brought at the initiative of the
injured party (who may not be able to afford the expense of bringing an
action on its own).86 Complaints brought by the Procuracy in economic
court also enjoy a higher chance of winning: according to the
Procuracy's figures, 82 percent of complaints brought by procurators are
successful, as opposed to the overall success rate of 51 percent.87 As a
matter of national policy, however, in addition to the potential for
political interference in commercial disputes, observers question the
wisdom of devoting scarce judicial resources to the general oversight
function of the Procuracy, rather than focusing on its prosecutorial
functions in fighting crime.88
In summary, the economic courts, while formally operating more
independently than did arbitrazh, retain certain features of the Soviet-era
system. The reform legislation still allows for potential government
significant number of these complaints involved legal abuses in the privatization process. Id.
at 77. One such case involved the chief doctor of a hospital who, with the permission of city
authorities, sold a two-story children's nursery building to a bank cooperative and a polyclinic
to an individual entrepreneur, property that belonged to the hospital. Id.
84. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, arts. 41(5), 42(4).
85. The provisions of the Procedure Code (see id. arts. 91-2) that require plaintiffs to pay
court costs when submitting a complaint do not apply to the Procuracy. See Treushnikov,
supra note 5, at 99.
86. Interview with Andrei Maximovitch (Senior researcher at the Institute of State and
Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences), in Moscow (June 21, 1996) [hereinafter
Maximovitch interview].
Court costs can be significant. When filing a complaint involving a property dispute
under the 1992 Procedure Code, for example, plaintiffs were required to pay ten percent of
the amount of the claim as court costs. 1992 CODE, supra note 30, art. 69. More recent
legislation on court fees differentiates fee amounts depending on both the type and amount of
the claim. See G. Shuleva, KHOZIAISTVO I PRAvo [KHoz. I PRAVO], 1996, No. 5, at 128-29
(citing Zakon 0 Gosudarstvennoi Poshline [Law on Government Duties], Dec. 31, 1995,
Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 1, item 19).
87. Pecherskii, supra note 83, at 78.
88. See Thaman, supra note 69, at 13.
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interference in the resolution of private economic disputes. Economic
court jurisdiction is defined to embrace disputes arising out of both civil
law and administrative law relations. Although in a sense the reforms
restore the pre-Revolutionary institution of specialized commercial
courts, the present-day courts function rather differently from the com-
mercial courts of old.
II. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
The resurrection of arbitration [treteiskii sud] as a mechanism for
resolving domestic commercial disputes in Russia has proceeded some-
what spontaneously since the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Arbitration, however, has been utilized in Russia to resolve disputes
since as early as the fourteenth century.8 9 Even during the Soviet era,
special arbitration tribunals were utilized to resolve commercial disputes
between Soviet entities and their foreign trading partners. This section
details the evolution of arbitration practice in Russia and discusses
current legislation.
A. History
The first legislative enactments on Russian arbitration existed three
centuries ago, in the code of Tsar Aleksei, 90 although it was only during
the mid-19th century that general regulation of arbitration first appeared
in Russia's 1857 Code of Laws, subsequently revised by the Code of
Civil Procedure of 1864 (1864 Code).91 The drafters of the 1864 Code
intended in particular to address the inadequacies of existing law in
order to make arbitration a convenient mechanism for private dispute
resolution.92 Pre-Revolutionary jurists argued in favor of encouraging the
resolution of disputes through arbitration based on the rationale that
private dispute resolution relieved government courts of "unnecessary
matters. ' 93 Consistent with this policy, the 1864 Code allowed parties
considerable scope to resolve civil disputes privately through arbitration,
89. According to Mintz, monuments from as early as the fourteenth century evidence the
arbitration of ancient disputes in Russia by third parties. P.M. Mintz, Treteiskaia Sdelka i
Treteiskii Sud [Agreements to Arbitrate and Arbitration], ZHURNAL MINISTERSTVA IUSTITSII,
1917, Nos. 5-6, at 154, 189.
90. Id. The Code was promulgated in the late 17th century.
91. Id. at 189-91 (citing UsTAv GRAZHDANSKOVO SUDOPROIZVODSTVA [CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE]) [hereinafter 1864 CODE].
92. Id. at 190.
93. V.L. ISACHENKO, 1 RUSSKOE GRAZHDANSKOE SUDOPROIZVODSTVO [RUSSIAN CIVIL
PROCEDURE] 202 (1901).
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provided that certain formalities were met in the arbitration agreement.94
The treatment of arbitration under the 1864 Code can be contrasted
with the most recent Russian legislation regulating domestic arbitra-
tion.9' First, the arbitration provisions of the 1864 Code did not require
arbitrators to apply Russian law; generally, an arbitrator rendered deci-
sions by relying on life experience and his own conscience. One jurist
argued in 1901 that ruling by conscience was in fact preferable to a
legalistic approach. He noted that "it is more advantageous and pleasant
for the dispute to be resolved on the basis of higher justice and life
truths, rather than on the basis of codified law," particularly when
parties are convinced that neither side is wrong. 6 In addition, although
courts had jurisdiction to enforce arbitration decisions during the pre-
Revolutionary era, the permitted bases for overturning or failing to
enforce an arbitration decision were narrowly defined. 97 Although a
reviewing court could in limited instances refuse to enforce an arbitra-
tion decision (e.g., if the arbitrators exceeded their authority as set forth
in the arbitration agreement), courts were not authorized to consider
whether a decision was rendered in accordance with Russian law. The
provisions of the 1864 Code, therefore, formally supported private
resolution of contract and property disputes by limiting government
interference in arbitration.
When the Soviet government came to power in 1917, the institution
of arbitration was abolished, only to be temporarily reestablished by
decree in 1924 as a dispute resolution mechanism for merchants during
the years of the New Economic Policy (NEP).95 Although the 1924
Decree remained on the books for decades, and was eventually included
as an appendix to the Russian Code of Civil Procedure,99 the formal
94. For example, in order to be valid, an arbitration agreement had to designate an odd
number of arbitrators, and the agreement had to be signed and notarized not only by the
parties to the potential dispute, but also by the designated arbitrators. Id. at 204-05 (citing to
the 1864 Code of Civil Procedure).
95. See infra Part II.B. 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of domestic arbitration
practice under current legislation.
96. ISACHENKO, supra note 93, at 203. This approach is not inconsistent with United
States and international commercial practice, according to which arbitrators may decide a
dispute ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeurs if the parties so provide in the arbitra-
tion agreement. See, e.g., GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN TiH
UNITED STATES (1994) 135-36 (1994) (discussing international commercial practice).
97. ISACHENKO, supra note 93, at 208. See also VAC'KOVSKII, supra note 40, at 365.
98. See John N. Hazard, Russian Decree on Ad Hoc Arbitration, 3 P.S. S.E.E.L. Nov.
1992(I), at 1, 5. See also Avilina, supra note 24, at 72-73.
99. See E. VINOGRADOVA, supra note 36, at 26 (citing Polozhenie 0 Treteiskom Sude
[Regulation on Arbitration], Prilozhenie No. 3 k GPK RSFSR [Attachment No. 3 to the
RSFSR Civil Procedure Code], June 11, 1964, Vedomosti RSFSR, 1964, No. 24, item 407).
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to make feasible the resolution of external trade disputes in Soviet
tribunals, the norms of the Soviet administrative-bureaucratic economy
were set aside in favor of commercial arbitration according to interna-
tionally accepted standards. 10 5 Indeed, the ICAC and the MAC have
enjoyed a solid reputation over the years for being competent, fair and
independent,' 6 and have developed rather extensive experience in the
resolution of international commercial disputes.1
°7
B. Post-Soviet Development of Domestic Arbitration
1. Regulation
During the first months following the break-up of the Soviet Union,
the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation passed a "temporary"
regulation to provide a legal framework for commercial arbitration of
Arbitration, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J. 34 (1969); Pisar, supra note 100; Volker Viechtbauer,
Arbitration in Russia, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 355 (1993).
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russian government enacted legislation on
international commercial arbitration that reaffirms the status of the MAC and the ICAC as
permanent arbitration tribunals with competence to handle international disputes. See Zakon
RF 0 Mezhdynarodnom Kommercheskom Arbitrazhe [On International Commercial Arbitra-
tion], July 7, 1993, Vedomosti RF, No. 32, item 1240 [hereinafter, International Arbitration
Law].
105. Samuel Pisar noted a paradox of totalitarian regimes such as the Soviet Union,
which did not as a formal matter reject doctrines of party autonomy in contractual relations
and the resolution of disputes through international arbitration. Pisar, supra note 100, at 1442,
1458. Although freedom of contract was touted as a principle of Communist law, the right to
contract was circumscribed in many respects by the exigencies of the plan. Pisar noted that in
spite of formal notions of party autonomy under Soviet law, the state's demands were found
to control contractual relations through "extralegal channels." Id. at 1443.
106. According to William Butler, in contrast with the Soviet-era judicial system, Soviet
arbitration "enjoyed a sound reputation." BUTLER, supra note 101, at 6. Samuel Pisar found
that opinions issued by the ICAC and MAC were often analytically comparable to "judgments
of authoritative courts of high instance" and that procedural rules were "scrupulously adhered
to." Pisar, supra note 100, at 1441-42. He cited one western arbitrator who considered the
ICAC to be "one of the best arbitral institutions of its kind in the world." Id. at 1417 n.26
(citing Frances Kellor, Coordination of Commercial Arbitration Systems, 1 ARB. J. (n.s.) 139,
140 (1946)). See also Kinig-Smith, supra note 104, at 37.
One historic limitation of the ICAC and the MAC that has deterred Western counterparts
from utilizing these tribunals in the past was the fact that arbitrators could only be chosen
from a limited list of Soviet arbitrators. The Rules of the ICAC have been liberalized so that
currently, only the chairman of the arbitral tribunal is to be chosen from the ICAC list of
arbitrators. Rules of the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the RF Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, secs. 2(3), 20(3), reprinted in 5 E. EUR. REP. (BNA) 702 at 703,
705 (Sept. 11, 1995) [hereinafter ICAC Rules]. In addition, the ICAC's list of arbitrators has
been expanded to include foreign (including mainly American and European) arbitrators: of
the 106 acting arbitrators, 34 are foreign. List of Arbitrators of the International Commercial
Arbitration Court at the RF Chamber of Commerce and Industry (current as of June 1996-on
file with author)[hereinafter List of Arbitrators].
107. During the period between 1984-86, for example, the ICAC issued decisions in at
least 610 disputes. VINOGRADOVA, supra note 36, at 34 (these decisions are published in
PRAKTIKA ARBITRAZHNOVA SUDA [ARBITRATION COURT PRACTICE] (1989)).
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availability of arbitration was rendered meaningless in practice by the
advent of central planning in the 1930s."° Soviet legal encyclopedias
during the 1950s claimed that Soviets did not utilize arbitration because
they had "full confidence" in the People's Courts.'0 ' In fact, private
settlement of commercial disputes through arbitration was impossible
since private enterprise was not permitted under the Soviet regime; any
other approach would have undermined the state's control over the
economy as exercised via central planning and the administrative resolu-
tion of disputes by state arbitrazh. Although weak development of
domestic arbitration during the Soviet era has been attributed to ideology
(e.g., to the private, autonomous nature of arbitration and the rights it
defends),"° more fundamentally, domestic arbitration did not exist by
virtue of the state's effective monopoly over domestic economic activity.
In one important respect, commercial arbitration was regularly
utilized to resolve economic disputes during the Soviet era. Shortly after
NEP was abandoned and state arbitrazh was introduced to the Soviet
economy during the 1930s, the Soviet government passed legislation
establishing two permanent arbitration tribunals to handle disputes
between Soviet trading organizations and their foreign counterparts: the
External Commerce Arbitration Commission (ICAC) 10 3 and the Maritime
Arbitration Commission at the Allunion Chamber of Commerce
(MAC).' 4 In order to adapt to the realities of international business and
In addition to the regulation cited above, a Soviet-era decree provided for the resolution
of economic disputes by "courts of conciliation" [treteiskie sudi]. Pomorski, supra note 7, at
71 n.55. These conciliation courts, however, were only vested with jurisdiction to resolve
disputes that were otherwise under the jurisdiction of arbitrazh, and were governed by a
statute issued by arbitrazh. In addition, it appears that the courts of conciliation were seldom
utilized. Id.
100. Avilina, supra note 24, at 73. See also Samuel Pisar, The Communist System of
Foreign-Trade Adjudication, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1459 (1959) ("[T]he progressive
attrition of all private initiative of any consequence has turned [the 1924 Arbitration Decree]
into a dead letter.").
101. Hazard, supra note 98, at 5. See also WILLIAM BUTLER, ARBITRATION IN THE
SOVIET UNION 77 (1989) (commenting that domestic arbitration was not widely used by
Soviet citizens and organizations, which seemed to "prefer" permanent institutions of dispute
resolution).
102. See Avilina, supra note 24, at 73.
103. See 1932 Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR on the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission attached to the USSR
All-Union Chamber of Commerce, translated in BUTLER, supra note 101, at 115. The ICAC
still exists in Russia and is now known as the International Commercial Arbitration Court
(ICAC) at the RF Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
104. See Statute on the Maritime Arbitration Commission attached to the All-Union
Chamber of Commerce, translated in BUTLER, supra note 101, at 150. The MAC still exists
in Russia and is now known as the Maritime Arbitration Commission at the RF Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. For discussions of the historical development and practice of the
ICAC and the MAC, see generally Sandford B. King-Smith, Communist Foreign-Trade
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The operative provisions of the Act and the Procedure Code have
narrowed but not eliminated the supervisory and educational role tradi-
tionally vested in state arbitrazh and in another Soviet judicial institu-
tion, the Procuracy.69 The Procedure Code vests the power to conduct a
"supervisory review" [peresmotr v poriadke nadzora] of lower court
decisions in the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Court (Presidi-
um). 70 There are several purposes cited for conducting supervisory
review: to prevent errors in the application of law, to guarantee the
rights of the parties, and to ensure uniform application of the law.71
Another purpose of the process is an educational one-the Economic
Court Act charges the Supreme Economic Court, among other things,
with publishing explanations on issues of judicial practice.72 The idea of
the court providing guidance to the lower courts and to the public on
legal issues follows the traditional practice of former state arbitrazh and
of Soviet courts generally.73
The power to present a request for supervisory review is vested in
four officials: the Procurator General, the Deputy Procurator General,
the Chairman of the Supreme Arbitration Court or the Deputy Chair-
69. In fact, the Procuracy has existed in- Russia since the 18th century, thus predating the
Soviet system. The powers of the Procuracy have been narrowed or expanded over the years
to suit the needs of the government in power at the time. Thus the powers of the Procuracy
were defined relatively narrowly during the years prior to the 1917 Revolution, but were
greatly expanded under Soviet rule. BERMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 240-47. The position
of the Procuracy in the justice system is roughly analogous to that of public prosecutors in the
United States. In addition to its prosecutorial role in criminal actions, however, the Russian
Procuracy is vested with supervisory authority over civil actions and administrative acts.
Professor Berman describes the office of the Procuracy during the Soviet era as combining
the functions of the U.S. Attorney General, Congressional investigating committees, grand
juries and public prosecutors. Id. at 239.
For a recent discussion of Procuracy reform in Russia, see Stephen Thaman, Reform of
the Procuracy and Bar in Russia, 3 PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 1 (1996). Drafts of Russia's
Constitution provided for a Procuracy with narrower powers, restricted to supervising criminal
investigations and prosecuting criminal cases. Id. at 11. The version of the Constitution that
was eventually adopted, however, left the scope of the Procuracy's powers to be determined
by federal legislation. KONST. RF, art. 129(5) (1993). Russia's most recent legislation on the
Procuracy still entrusts the institution with broad oversight powers for both civil and criminal
matters. See Thaman, supra at 16 n.77 (citing Zakon 0 Prokuratore RF [Law on the RF
Procuracy], Nov. 20, 1995, Sobr. Zakonod. RF (1995), No. 47, item 472).
70. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art. 180. The provisions of the Procedure Code
dealing with supervisory review refer only to the Presidium as the body authorized to conduct
supervisory review of lower court decisions. Id. art. 91. See also Iakovlev and lukov, supra
note 6, at 53.
71. Treushnikov, supra note 5, at 293.
72. Economic Court Act, supra note 29, art. 10(1.5).
73. For a discussion of the traditional educational role of Soviet courts, see BERMAN,
JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 299-311.
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man. 74 Each of these judicial officials has the right to initiate review of
lower court cases, whether arising in the area of administrative or civil
law relations. For example, the Supreme Economic Court recently
allowed the Procurator General to initiate review of a lower court deci-
sion upholding a commercial arbitration award.75 Although far-reaching
by western standards, the Procuracy's oversight powers to bring a
supervisory appeal are less broad than they were prior to the 1995
reform of the Procedure Code,76 not to mention during the Soviet era.
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Economic Court
is not a court of ultimate appeal by the parties. The only way to present
a case to the Supreme Economic Court is through the above-mentioned
mechanism of supervisory appeal.77 This is not to say, however, that the
right of a party to appeal an economic court decision is completely fore-
closed. The Procedure Code allows a party to appeal at two levels:
appeal at the appellate instance [apelliatsionnaia instantsia] (appellate
review) and appeal at the cassation instance [kassatsionnaia instantsia]
(cassation review). Appellate review allows a party to appeal a decision
to the same economic court that heard the case at first instance, to
review issues of both fact and law.78 Cassation review is conducted by a
new institution in Russia, established by the 1995 reforms as a second
74. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art. 181. Decisions of the Supreme Economic
Court may be appealed to the Presidium by only two officials: the Procurator General or the
President of the Supreme Economic Court. Id.
75. Postanovlenie No. 15 Plenuma Vyshevo Arbitrazhnovo Suda RF [Ruling No. 15 of
the Plenum of the RF Supreme Economic Court], May 24, 1994, reprinted in Ross. IUST.,
1994, No. 10, at 55. The plaintiff in this case, Interrepublic Commerce-Production Concern
(ICPC), submitted a motion to the Moscow Regional Arbitration Court to enforce a judgment
for 166.9 million rubles in damages and 6 million rubles in arbitration fees against the
defendant, Promkombinat No. 3. The Procurator General initiated a supervisory appeal of the
decision of the Moscow court which had granted the motion and issued an order of enforce-
ment. The Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court (which at the time was authorized to
conduct supervisory review) rejected the argument that the enforcement of arbitration deci-
sions was immune from supervisory appeal and reversed and remanded the decision to the
Moscow court. The Plenum found that the ruling of the Moscow court was not well-grounded
in that it failed to set forth the physical location of "Iurinf" as then required by the Procedure
Code.
76. See, e.g., 1992 CODE, supra note 30, art. 34 (authorizing a procurator other than the
Procurator General or his deputy to initiate a supervisory appeal). See also infra note 84 and
accompanying text (allowing a party's wishes to trump the procurator's right to bring suit at
first instance).
77. Treushnikov, supra note 5, at 281 (stating that the Supreme Arbitration Court does
not have jurisdiction to review an appeal brought by a party).
78. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, arts. 145-146, 158. The rule providing for appel-
late review in the court of first instance, apparently adopted to economize on judicial resourc-
es, has been criticized by Russian scholars as undermining judicial independence. See
Treushnikov, supra note 5, at 256-57. Note that the Procedure Code prohibits a judge who
reviewed a case at first instance to conduct appellate review of the same case. PROCEDURE
CODE, supra note 30, art. 18(1).
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economic disputes.' °8 The Arbitration Regulation, while providing a
much-needed legislative basis for governing the activity of arbitration
tribunals, also hinders the development of domestic arbitration in Russia
by limiting the availability of domestic arbitration and providing broad
scope for government interference in the arbitration process.
First, the regulation limits the availability of commercial arbitration
to disputes that (i) are otherwise within the jurisdiction of an economic
court"0 9 and (ii) do not involve management [upravlenie], i.e., are not
administrative."0 While it may be natural to declare administrative cases
off-limits from arbitration, limiting commercial arbitration to disputes that
are otherwise within economic court jurisdiction effectively limits arbitra-
tion to disputes among businesses and registered entrepreneurs. Since the
Arbitration Regulation defines the scope of arbitration by the scope of
economic court jurisdiction, disputes involving individual consumers (i.e.,
non-entrepreneurs) lie outside of economic court jurisdiction and therefore
are not arbitrable. Although there may be a legitimate concern about
forcing inexperienced, weaker parties into arbitration, the Civil Code's
existing provision on adhesion contracts addresses this concern directly."'
Limiting arbitration to disputes among entrepreneurs is particularly
restrictive given the meaning of this term under the Procedure Code:
entrepreneurs include either legal entities or individuals that are registered
as organizations or entrepreneurs under Russian law." 2 In other words,
the availability of arbitration hinges on the legal formality of registration
108. Vremennoe Polozhenie o Treteiskom Sude dlia Razreshenie Ekonomicheskih
Sporov [Temporary Regulation on Commercial Arbitration for the Resolution of Economic
Disputes], June 24, 1992, Vedomosti RF, No. 30, item 1790 [hereinafter Arbitration Regula-
tion]. A law on arbitration has been pending for several years. Current drafts indicate that the
pending law will govern only domestic arbitration. Interview with Alexei Kostin, in Moscow,
Russ. (June 21, 1996) (Vice-President of the ICAC and President of the MICEX Arbitration
Commission) [hereinafter Kostin interview]. Therefore, international arbitration conducted by
tribunals such as the ICAC and the MAC most likely will continue to be regulated by the
International Arbitration Law even if the pending law is passed.
For a detailed description of the Arbitration Regulation, see Hazard, supra note 98, at 5.
109. The Arbitration Regulation applies when an economic dispute that is "within economic
court jurisdiction" is referred to arbitration. Arbitration Regulation, supra note 108, art. 1.
110. As is discussed below, an economic court may refuse to enforce an arbitration
decision if, among other things, "the dispute arose in the sphere of management and is not
subject to review by an arbitration tribunal." Id. art. 26.
111. One concern may be the use of standard form contracts. The Civil Code allows the
adhering party to an adhesion contract [dogovor prisoedinenia] to demand cancellation or
modification if the contract deprives the party of rights to which it is otherwise entitled under
contracts of this type, eliminates or limits the liability of the other party for breach or otherwise
contains provisions that the adhering party would not have accepted had it been able to
participate in determining the terms of the agreement. CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, art. 428(2).
The chief judge of Russia's Supreme Economic Court, while praising the inclusion of
Article 428 in the Civil Code, believes that the concept of adhesion contract is still insuffi-
ciently developed under Russian law. See Shestopal, supra note 58, at 88.
112. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art. 22(1.1). As to the requisite procedure for
registering as an entrepreneur, see supra note 49.
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by each of the parties. Thus in Russia, a contract between a stock broker
and a client could not be resolved by arbitration under the Arbitration
Regulation unless the client was also a registered entrepreneur.
The most problematic aspect of the Arbitration Regulation, however,
relates to the compulsory enforcement of arbitration decisions. The
Arbitration Regulation gives the authority of compulsory enforcement to
the economic courts; it provides that jurisdiction over any action to
enforce an arbitral decision is vested in the economic court having
jurisdiction over the territory in which the arbitration tribunal is located."'
For example, if a party to arbitration conducted by the Moscow Interbank
Currency Exchange's tribunal wished to legally enforce the tribunal's
decision, it would need to apply to the economic court located in Mos-
cow.
Article 26 of the Arbitration Regulation enumerates the bases on
which a reviewing economic court may refuse to issue an order of
enforcement of an arbitration award. An economic court might refuse to
enforce a decision rendered by an arbitration tribunal, for example, if the
make-up of the arbitration panel was inconsistent with the intent of the
parties as expressed in the arbitration agreement." 4 Such a procedural
113. Arbitration Regulation, supra note 108, art. 25. Note that, in contrast with domestic
arbitration decisions, decisions of international commercial arbitration tribunals are enforced
by courts of general jurisdiction in accordance with the 1964 RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure.
GRAZHDANSKYI PROTSESSUAL'NYI KODEKS RSFSR [GPK RSFSR][RSFSR CIVIL PROCEDURE
CODE], Part 5, ch.38, §§ 338, 340, as amended on June 11, 1964, translated in The Code of
Civil Procedure of the RSFSR, in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 543 (William Simons ed. &
A.K.R. Kiralfy trans., 1980).
114. Article 26 of the Arbitration Regulation reads as follows:
An economic court [arbitrazhnyi sud] may refuse to issue an order for the
enforcement of an arbitration decision in the following cases:
if the parties did not reach agreement on the submission of the dispute to
arbitration;
if the makeup of the arbitration tribunal or the procedure for reviewing the
dispute was not in accordance with the parties' agreement to arbitrate;
if the party against whom an arbitration award was decided was not informed
in an appropriate manner of the date for arbitration proceedings or for another reason
was not able to present his arguments;
if the dispute arose in the sphere of administration and was not capable of
resolution in arbitration.
Determinations of an economic court may be appealed in the manner provided
in the RF Arbitration Procedure Code.
If, in reviewing an application for the issuance of an order of compulsory
enforcement of an arbitration award, it is established that the award is not in
accordance with the law or was issued on the basis of unexamined material, the
economic court shall remand the case for additional review by the arbitration tribunal
that issued the award.
If it is not possible for the dispute to be reviewed in the same arbitration
tribunal, the complaint may be transferred to the arbitration court that has jurisdiction
over the dispute.
Arbitration Regulation, supra note 108, art. 26.
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basis for refusing to enforce an arbitration decision is not unusual.
What is controversial, however, is that Article 26 also authorizes a
reviewing economic court to conduct a substantive review of the arbi-
tration decision in order to determine whether the decision was rendered
in accordance with Russian law. If the reviewing court finds either that
the decision contradicts Russian law or that the decision is unsubstanti-
ated, Article 26 directs the reviewing court to remand the dispute to the
arbitration tribunal that issued the decision or-if review by the same
arbitration tribunal is not feasible-to transfer the dispute to an economic
court." 5 Because it allows for substantive review of arbitration decisions,
Article 26 has been harshly criticized by Russian jurists as permitting
excessive involvement by economic courts in the arbitration process."
6
By allowing economic courts to conduct substantive review of arbitration
decisions, the Arbitration Regulation departs from U.S. arbitration prac-
tice". as well as from Russian arbitration practice prior to 1917.
Related to substantive review is the question of whether arbitrators
may decide disputes on the basis of commercial or equitable principles.
Arbitrators associated with the Association of Russian Banks, for exam-
ple, might be guided by standards of what is customary in the banking
industry." 8 The Arbitration Regulation directs arbitrators to make deci-
sions in light of "trade practices suitable to the contract at hand."" 9 It is
uncertain, however, whether an arbitration agreement providing that
115. In addition, an economic court decision enforcing or refusing to enforce an arbitration
decision is subject to supervisory review [peresmotr v poriadke nadzora]. See supra note 75
and accompanying text.
116. See generally, E.A. Vinogradova, Zakonodatel'stvo o Treteiskom Sude, KHOZ I
PRAvo, 1992, No. 10, at 92, 97-98 (criticizing the last two paragraphs of Article 26 as the
"fundamental deficiency" of the Arbitration Regulation). A Russian arbitrator and law professor
has commented that the principal defect of the Arbitration Regulation lies in the potential
Article 26 allows for government interference in arbitration. Kostin interview, supra note 108.
117. Under U.S. law, a federal court is authorized to vacate an arbitration award solely on
one of the following grounds (all relating to arbitrator misconduct): (i) corruption or fraud; (ii)
partiality; (iii) improper failure to postpone a hearing or admit evidence; or (iv) exceeding its
powers. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §10 (1994). Although U.S. courts have articulated
what appear to be non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards, such as "manifest
disregard for the law," in substance these grounds are similar to concluding that the arbitrator
exceeded his powers. See IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.1.3.2.
(1995). It is perhaps ironic that the Arbitration Regulation directs a court to reverse arbitration
awards on substantive grounds (that is, on whether the arbitrators correctly applied Russian law)
but not on grounds of corruption of the arbitrators.
118. In an analysis of arbitration practice in the New York diamond trading industry, Lisa
Bernstein found that arbitrators did not rely primarily on the New York law of contract and
damages, but rather drew on "trade custom and usage, a little common sense, some Jewish law,
and, last, common-law legal principles." Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 126-27
(1992).
119. Arbitration Regulation, supra note 108, art. 18.
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arbitrators shall apply only equitable or commercial law principles would
be upheld, or whether a decision issued in accordance with such a clause
would be reversed as inconsistent with Russian law pursuant to Article
26. The orientation towards applicable norms expressed in the Arbitration
Regulation appears to be more limited than the approach taken under
Russian law prior to 1917.120
2. Practice
Although the Arbitration Regulation was passed soon after the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union, Russian lawyers and businessmen had been
forming domestic arbitration tribunals for many months prior to the
promulgation of the regulation. These tribunals were set up spontaneous-
ly-that is, without comprehensive legislation establishing their legitimacy,
defining their permitted sphere of activity, or providing a procedure for
the enforcement of their decisions.'
2
'
Among the first arbitration tribunals set up in the Soviet Union since
the establishment of the MAC and ICAC in the 1930s was an arbitration
tribunal sponsored by the USSR Union of Jurists in August 1990. The
Union of Jurists is an organization open to all members of the legal
profession, with a membership during the Soviet era of over 30,000.122
Although the Union of Jurists established its arbitration tribunal in August
1990 (almost two years prior to the adoption of the Arbitration Regula-
tion), the establishment of the tribunal was expressly authorized by the
Soviet government in the form of a special decree.
123
120. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of arbitration practice
prior to 1917.
121. There was still on the books the seldom-utilized decree on arbitration that became
part of the 1964 Civil Procedure Code. See GPK RSFSR supra note 113, Attachment No. 3.
In addition, the 1992 Procedure Code included provisions on the enforcement of decisions issued
by arbitration tribunals. These provisions of the 1992 Procedure Code were eventually
incorporated into the Arbitration Regulation. 1992 CODE, supra note 30, art. 157.
122. Viechtbauer, supra note 104, at 433. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the USSR
Union of Jurists was renamed as a international non-governmental organization, the Union of
Jurists (Soiuz luristov-hereinafter Union of Jurists]. V. Grebennikov, Spor Razreshaetsia v
Treteiskom Sude [Disputes are Resolved by Arbitration], KHOZ. I PRAvo, 1992, No. 11, at 81,
83.
I have been told that the Union of Jurists was originally formed during the Soviet era as
an organic, independent movement organized at the initiative of Russian lawyers. Later, the
Soviet government asserted control over the Union of Jurists and bureaucratized it.
123. See Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR Voprosi Soiuza Iuristov SSSR [Resolution
of the USSR Council of Ministers on Questions regarding the USSR Union of Jurists], Apr. 13,
1990, point 2, reprinted in VINOGRADOVA, supra note 36, at 70. See also Vinogradova, supra
note 116, at 98 (citing Zakon USSR Ob Obshchestvennykh Ob'edineniakh [USSR Law on
Social Organizations], Oct. 9, 1990, art. 17 (authorizing the activity of the arbitration tribunal
as a social organization)). Legislation specifically addressing the activity of arbitration tribunals
in resolving civil disputes was not enacted, however, until the Arbitration Regulation was passed
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One distinguishing feature of the arbitration tribunal sponsored by the
Union of Jurists is the quality of its arbitrators. As the former chief
arbitrator affiliated with the Union of Jurists points out, its list of arbi-
trators includes doctors and doctoral candidates in law, jurists "whose
names are literally known throughout all of Russia."' 24 Another interesting
feature is the importance that the institution's rules place on mediating
disputes. The rules for Union of Jurists arbitration set forth in detail a
voluntary procedure for the mediation of disputes conducted by an
arbitrator designated by the president of the tribunal.'25 The Union of
Jurists was one of the first organizations in Russia to recognize the
desirability of supporting Russian business by sponsoring institutional
arbitration staffed with a list of highly respected arbitrators.
At the other end of the spectrum, as arbitration became a viable
alternative to arbitrazh, certain Russians (for example, retired judges or
other jurists) have been known to "set up shop" as individual arbitrators
to earn a living. 126 The potential for individual arbitrators to operate as
in June 1992.
124. Grebennikov, supra note 122, at 83.
In terms of resolving international disputes, however, it is doubtful that Union of Jurists
enjoys more credibility than the ICAC. Cf. Viechtbauer, supra note 104, at 434. Both the ICAC
and the Union of Jurists maintain a list of arbitrators that include some of the most respected
jurists in Russia. Indeed, eight of the 32 arbitrators on the Union of Jurist's list of arbitrators
are also on the ICAC's list of arbitrators. List of Arbitrators of the Union of Jurists [current as
of January 1993], reprinted in Vinogradova, supra note 116, at 94; List of Arbitrators, supra
note 106. Most significantly, in spite of the high credentials of its arbitrators, in practice
arbitration sponsored by the Union of Jurists is infrequently utilized. Maximovitch interview,
supra note 86.
125. Reglament Treteiskovo Suda, Utverzhden Postanovleniem Ispolkoma Tsentral'novo
Soveta Soiuza Iuristov [Rules of the Arbitration Court, Affirmed by Resolution of the Executive
Committee of the Central Committee of the Union of Jurists], Aug. 30, 1990, §15, reprinted
in VINOcRADOVA, supra note 36, at 79 [hereinafter Union of Jurists Rules]. Revisions to the
rules adopted in 1993 further expand and set forth in greater detail the procedure for mediation
of disputes. The expressed purpose of these revisions is to assist better the parties to the dispute
in preserving a cooperative business relationship. R.F. Kallistratova, 0 Pravovom Statuse
Treteiskovo Suda [On the Legal Status of Arbitration Tribunals], KHOZ. I PRAvo, 1993, No.
12, at 105.
The Union of Jurists may be responding to a perceived demand for mediation. A number
of institutional arbitration rules fail to provide expressly for mediation of disputes. Compare,
e.g., ICAC Rules, supra note 106, §43 (terminating arbitration in the event of settlement without
specifying a procedure for mediation); Reglament Arbitrazhnoi Komissii pri Moskovskoi
Tovarnoi Birzhe [Rules of the Arbitration Commission at the Moscow Commodities Exchange
(MCE)] Oct. 16, 1991, as amended on July 29, 1992, reprinted in VINOGRADOVA, supra note
36, at 168 (no provision for mediation or settlement) [hereinafter MCE rules].
The arbitration tribunal at the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), on the
other hand, has expanded its rules to provide a special mediation procedure. See Soglasitel'nyi
Reglament Arbitrazhnoi Komissii pri MMVB [Conciliatory Rules of the Arbitration Commission
of MICEX], as amended on Sept. 28, 1995 (on file with author). This was done at the request
of the member banks, who are interested in an alternative to arbitration as a mechanism for
resolving disputes among member banks. Kostin interview, supra note 108.
126. Kostin interview, supra note 108.
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small businesses in Russia has prompted a certain amount of debate in
Russian academic literature as to whether the law should limit the
permitted form of arbitration tribunals, such as requiring tribunals to be
not-for-profit organizations.' 27
Another type of arbitration tribunal that has spontaneously evolved
in recent years is a by-product of the transformation of arbitrazh into
economic courts. Because the reform of Soviet state arbitrazh involved
the abolition of the branch courts of departmental arbitrazh, some of the
abolished departmental arbitrazh courts were converted into what R.
Kallistratova refers to as "pseudo-arbitration tribunals."'28 Some of these
tribunals operate with lists of as few as three arbitrators and resolve
disputes without the parties' agreement on the selection of arbitrators.' 29
Most likely, these "pseudo" tribunals are an attempt by former Soviet
departmental arbitrators and enterprise management to perpetuate the
preexisting system of inter-enterprise dispute resolution. 30
One example of departmental arbitrazh-turned-arbitration tribunal is
the tribunal attached to the company "Avtocel'khozmash-Holding."'' 3
This tribunal was created in 1992 out of the departmental arbitrazh
subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Automobile and Farm Machine
Production. 32 When the activity of departmental arbitrazh was completed
127. See, e.g., Kallistratova, supra note 125 (arguing in favor of defining the status of
arbitration tribunals); cf E.A. Vinogradova, K Voprosy o Tak Nazyvaimom 'Statuse' Postoianno
Deistvuiushchevo Treteiskovo Suda [On the Question of the So-called 'Status' of Permanent
Arbitration Tribunals], KHOZ. I PRvo, 1994, No. 3 (arguing that the law should not limit the
status or organizational form of arbitration tribunals).
128. R.F. Kallistratova, Eshcho Raz o Treteiskikh Sudakh [More on Arbitration], KHOZ.
I PRAVO, 1993, No. 9, at 69.
129. Id.
130. Some Russians believe that the arbitrators of these "pseudo" tribunals do not act
independent of enterprise management, but continue to respond to orders from above. In fact,
management may support the establishment of these tribunals as a mechanism for controlling
enterprise activity.
Also relevant in this regard is a statement of A. Arifulin, former deputy president of the
short-lived USSR Supreme Economic Court (precurser to the Supreme Economic Court). In an
article discussing the USSR law on the USSR Supreme Economic Court (enacted a few months
prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, in May 1991), Arifulin referred to the role that
arbitration was expected to play in the new system:
In connection with the gradual liquidation of ministerial and departmental arbitrazh
as organs of compulsory jurisdiction we see the development of arbitration tribunals
.... these hastily organized arbitration tribunals will either lie idle or will in essence
replace ministerial and departmental arbitrazh.
Arifulin, supra note 27, at 23.
131. Roughly translated, "Auto-Farm Machine Holding Company" [hereinafter ACM-
Holding].
132. For a discussion of the activity of this tribunal, see A. Sergeev, Treteiskii Sud: Opyt
Raboty [Arbitration: Work Experience], KHOZ. I PRAvo, 1993, No. 12, at 105 (discussing the
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in the fall of 1991 (when the first version of the Economic Court Act
came into force), the chief arbitrator of what is now ACM-Holding ap-
proached enterprise management in the industry with the proposal to set
up an arbitration tribunal. Over one hundred enterprises endorsed the
proposal, and the tribunal was established.
However, without the Soviet institution of arbitrazh, the number of
disputes brought to arbitration fell significantly.'33 The chief arbitrator
attributes the decline in part to the change in dynamic between suppliers
and purchasers in the transition economy: in an environment where
contracts are no longer obligatory but where parties have long-term
trading relationships, purchasers are not in a position to litigate breaches
of contract for fear of losing existing suppliers. 3' The example of ACM-
Holding, however, illustrates another interesting consequence of replacing
compulsory state arbitrazh with "pseudo-arbitration": once the affirmative
obligation to litigate contract disputes was eliminated, Russian enterprises
apparently conducted business relations without resorting to litigation or
arbitration.
The area of the domestic economy where arbitration has been most
actively utilized in recent years is Russia's burgeoning network of
exchanges. As the Soviet planned economy metamorphosed into a market
economy during the last months of the Soviet Union, the lack of a
developed market gave rise to a proliferation of exchanges, beginning in
the summer of 1990 with the establishment of the Moscow Commodities
Exchange (MCE).' 35
activity of this tribunal).
133. Id at 106.
134. d
135. E. Shmeleva, Zakonodatel'noe Regulirovanie Fondovykh Birzh v Rossii [Legal Regu-
lation of Stock Exchanges in Russia], KHozI. I PRAVO, 1995, No. 3, at 52. As Shmeleva puts
it, enterprises transacted with each other almost "blindly," given the lack of market information
among buyers and sellers. The exchanges provided an immediate market, where brokers made
immense profits matching buyers and sellers. The exchanges traded everything from computers
to bricks to human hair, and grew rapidly in number-there were as many as 1,000 of them
before the exchanges began to specialize and decrease. See Russia: Milestones on the Capitalist
Road, EUROMONEY, July 19, 1994, at 34. The MCE recently went out of business, in March
1996.
Russia's largest currency exchange is the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange
(MICEX), which was established in early 1992 as the successor to the USSR state bank (whose
currency auction market had accounted for the vast majority of foreign currency transactions
under Soviet rule). Id. Membership to MICEX is restricted to banks.
Exchanges began to specialize in stock transactions with the advent of voucher privatiza-
tion in the fall of 1992; however, when the voucher program was phased out in mid-1994, the
bulk of the exchanges' stock trading went away as well. See Russia: Teething Troubles for the
Baby Giant, EUROMONEY, Sept. 30, 1994, at 92. Most stock trading is transacted in the over-
the-counter market. In fact, more powerful than the stock exchanges is the National Association
of Stock Market Participants (known by its Russian acronym, NAUFOR), a brokers' associa-
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Many of these exchanges have established arbitration tribunals to
handle disputes arising out of transactions executed on the exchanges. In
1993, Kallistratova estimated that the exchanges had formed over 400
arbitration tribunals. 136 Prominent examples of the specialized arbitration
tribunals that have been set up include tribunals sponsored by the Mos-
cow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) and the MCE.'37
Since transactions on the exchanges may be executed by brokers,
disputes on the exchanges could potentially arise out of either the contract
between a broker and his client or the contract between a buyer and
seller. Either type of contract may be resolved by an exchange's arbitra-
tion commission, but only if the parties have contractually agreed to
resolve their disputes in this manner. 3 ' If a dispute arises out of a
contract containing an arbitration clause and executed by the brokers as
agents for buyer and seller, the dispute may be resolved by arbitration
only if each broker was expressly authorized to include an arbitration
clause in the sales contract. 139 Published opinions of the MCE illustrate
tion. NAUFOR has recently applied for formal status of a self-regulatory association, which,
if granted, would enhance NAUFOR's leverage in controlling brokerage activity. Natasha
Mileusnic, Stockbroker Group Seeks Regulatory Status, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 3, 1996, at 10.
NAUFOR's predecessor, PAUFOR, recently set up an arbitration tribunal. Kostin interview,
supra note 108.
136. Kallistratova, supra note 128, at 72.
137. One of the most active and successful domestic arbitration tribunals set up in Russia
is not sponsored by an exchange, but by the Association of Russian Banks. This arbitration
tribunal was set up to resolve disputes arising out of banking transactions, although its authority
is not limited to this (in fact, one of the disputes that it decided involved a contract for the
delivery of lumber). Professor Kostin attributes the relative success of arbitration sponsored by
the Association of Russian Banks to the fact the Association's members are very powerful; thus
the threat of expulsion from the organization provides an extralegal means of enforcing
arbitration decisions issued by the tribunal. Kostin interview, supra note 108.
For a discussion of the practice of the arbitration tribunal sponsored by the Association
of Russian Banks, see L. Balayan, Treteiskii Sud Assotsiatsii Rossiiskikh Bankov: Itogi Pervovo
Goda Raboty [Arbitration Tribunal of the Association of Russian Banks: Results of the First
Year of Operation], VESTN. VYSH. ARB. SUDA RF, 1994, No. 10, at 117.
138. See Arbitration Regulation, supra note 108, art. 26 (allowing an economic court to
refuse to enforce an arbitration decision in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate). The
agreement to arbitrate must be in writing. Id. art. 3.
The MCE, for example, recommended that the following contractual language be included
to submit contractual disputes to arbitration:
In the event of a dispute arising out of or relating to [BROKER-CLIENT CONTRACTS:
the amendment, rescission or execution of this agreement] [SALES CONTRACTS: any
exchange transaction completed on the MCE and authorized by this contract], unless
the parties agree otherwise, the dispute will be submitted to arbitration in accordance
With the Statute and Rules of the Arbitration Commission of the MCE.
Iz Praktiki Arbitrazhnoi Komissii pri MTB [From the Practice of the MCE Arbitration
Commission], Oct. 16, 1991, as amended on Mar. 4, 1992, reprinted in VINOGRADOVA, supra
note 36, at 220-21.
139. The Supreme Economic Court issued a letter instructing economic courts to consider
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the types of disputes that have been brought to arbitration on the com-
modities exchanges." Perhaps because of the widespread use of prepay-
ment clauses in sales contracts, 4' these opinions typically involved
actions by buyers seeking a remedy for nondelivery or delivery of
defective goods, or actions by sellers seeking liquidated damages.
42
In spite of the interest that commercial arbitration has generated
among jurists and the flurry of activity in recent years to establish
domestic arbitration tribunals, it is necessary to emphasize that the
institution of arbitration is still only rarely utilized in Russia. In her book
on Russian arbitration, E. Vinogradova reported that the number of
disputes heard by arbitration tribunals is "incomparably less" than the
number of disputes brought to economic courts.' Even the most suc-
cessful tribunals, for example, have heard at most 100 cases in the first
year of operations.' 44
3. Enforcement of Decisions
As was discussed above, the enforcement provisions of the Arbitra-
tion Regulation have generated a great deal of criticism among Russian
invalid any arbitration clause entered into by a broker without express client authorization. See
Informatsionnoe Pis'mo RF Vysshevo Arbitrazhnovo Suda "Ob Otdel'nykh Resheniiakh,
Priniatykh na Soveshchaniiakh po Sudebno-Arbitrazhnoi Praktike" [Information Letter of the
RF Supreme Economic Court "On Separate Decisions taken at Meetings on Judicial-Arbitra-
tion Practice"], Nov. 27, 1992, reprinted in VESTN. VYSH. ARB. SuDA RF, 1993, No. 1, at
105-06. Of course, a sales agreement executed by brokers on an exchange could also be
submitted to arbitration if the buyer and seller subsequently agreed to arbitration. Id.
140. These opinions are published in VINOGRADOVA, supra note 36, at 226-35.
141. The published MCE opinions evidence a tendency to use prepayment clauses. This
tendency is also consistent with Kathryn Hendley's research on post-privatization contracts
entered into by Russian enterprise managers, which found widespread usage of prepayment
clauses in procurement contracts. See Kathryn Hendley,. The Spillover Effects of Privatization
on Russian Legal Culture, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 55-56 (1995).
142. Liquidated damages clauses appear to be common in Russian sales contracts, perhaps
because monetary penalties for nonperformance were also utilized under the Soviet system. See
Id at 52. On the use of liquidated damages in Soviet contract law, see Kroll, supra note 14,
at 123. The Russian Civil Code allows the award of liquidated damages [neustoika] without
proof of actual damages, but allows a court to reduce the amount of liquidated damages where
they are clearly incommensurate with the consequences of breach. CIVIL CODE, supra note 3,
arts. 330, 333. In one case decided by MCE arbitration, for example, brokers on the'MCE
executed a sales contract, pursuant to which the buyer was obligated to pay the contract price
within a three-day period. After the period had expired, the buyer sent a telegram requesting
permission to make payment. The seller refused payment and brought an action seeking
liquidated damages in the amount of 15% of the contract price. The tribunal ruled in favor of
the seller, finding that the buyer's failure to pay within the specified period amounted to a
repudiation of the contract. Resheniia Arbitrazhnoi Komissii i MTB po Otdel'nym Delam
[Decisions of the MCE Arbitration Commission on Separate Matters], Case No. 16, reprinted
in VINOGRADOVA, supra note 36, at 235.
143. VINOGRADOVA, supra note 36, at 34.
144. Id.
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jurists. 45 Some attribute Russians' failure to utilize arbitration to the
enforcement provisions of the law. If the only means of enforcing an
arbitration award requires subjecting the award to substantive review by
an economic court, the rationale for resorting to arbitration in the first
place is undermined, which arguably has a chilling effect on arbitration.
4 6
Others attribute an apparent preference for litigation over arbitration
in part to the enforcement powers of economic courts. 47 One advantage
of economic court litigation as opposed to arbitration relates to
enforcement: compulsory enforcement of an arbitration decision
ultimately requires a court order. In contrast, Russian law vests
economic courts with the power to freeze bank accounts 4' and to direct
banks (under threat of severe penalties) to pay defendants' funds over to
injured parties to enforce judgments.'49 Russian litigants are particularly
concerned about ensuring that defendants do not frustrate enforcement
by removing assets from the jurisdiction, t50 and thus need to move
quickly. Although the rules of certain arbitration tribunals provide for
the granting of interim orders of protection, 151 compulsory enforcement
145. See supra notes 116-17.
146. Kostin interview, supra note 108. Other critics, while condemning the law's
enforcement provisions as an undue interference in the arbitration process, have noted on the
other hand the relatively high level of voluntary enforcement of arbitration awards. See
Sergeev, supra note 132, at 109 (stating that parties to arbitration at ACM-Holding have not
yet been forced to petition economic court for compulsory enforcement); VINOGRADOVA, supra
note 36, at 137 (observing a high level of voluntary enforcement of domestic arbitration
awards).
147. Maximovitch interview, supra note 86.
148. The Procedure Code authorizes an economic court to take provisional measures,
including the placing of defendant's assets under arrest, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the failure to take such measures would burden or render impossible the enforcement of an
award. PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, arts. 75-76.
149. An economic court enforcement order directing the payment of money to a plaintiff
is issued directly to the bank or financial institution holding the defendant's monetary assets.
PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 30, art 198. If a bank or financial institution fails to comply
with such an enforcement order, it may be subject.to a fine of up to 50% of the amount of
payment requested, and may also risk losing its license. Id. art. 206.
150. In a recent article published in the Russian financial press, a court marshal for the
city of Moscow recounted how Russian defendants tend to purchase phony addresses for
purposes of frustrating the enforcement of court judgments. In one instance, the company
"Aero-Nika" was held liable for the death of 104 passengers and crew in an airplane crash.
Implementation of the court's enforcement order was frustrated, as it turned out that the
airline's bank account had a zero balance and the company's legal address belonged to a
residential apartment. Management of the airline managed to flee abroad. M. Gordeeva,
'Ternovyi Venets' dlia Sudebnovo Ispolnitelia ["Crown of Thorns" for Court Marshals],
EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN [EKON. i Z.] (Moscow issue), June 1996, No. 25, at 15 (interview with
Court Marshal Elena Poliakova).
151. The rules of arbitration at the MICEX provide that a plaintiff may request interim
measures of protection, including the arrest of defendant's monetary assets, if the plaintiff can
demonstrate that failure to take such measures would fundamentally burden or make impossi-
ble enforcement of the arbitration decision. Reglament Treteiskovo Razbiratel'stva
[Vol. 18:59
Economic Disputes in Russia's Market Economy
of any such order can only be obtained through an economic court.
But the advantage of economic courts over arbitration with respect to
enforcement powers is less significant in practice than in principle, given
social and historical factors that undermine the strength and independence
of the Russian judiciary.'52 In fact, the relatively strong enforcement
powers vested in economic courts by law are often not implemented in
practice. 153
Moreover, in addition to being subject to compulsory enforcement in
court, decisions of arbitration tribunals on the exchanges may be en-
forceable by extralegal mechanisms, which are particularly important in
Russia given social and historic factors that weaken the judiciary. Mem-
bership on an exchange or in a trade association may be valuable or even
essential to a Russian entrepreneur. Therefore, the threat of expulsion
from such an organization or the loss of reputation among its members
for failure to comply may operate as a sufficient deterrent to ensure that
awards issued by an arbitration tribunal are enforced without resort to an
economic court. 54 For example, the threat of reputation loss within the
Arbitrazhnoi Komissii pri MMVB [Rules of Arbitration of the MICEX Arbitration Commis-
sion], as amended on Sept. 28, 1996, arts. 14-15 (on file with author).
152. See infra Part III.
153. Comprehensive legislation on the enforcement of court decisions has not been enacted
since the Soviet era. Draft laws on enforcement procedure and on court marshals are currently
pending in the government. Gordeeva, supra note 150, at 15. Court marshals in Moscow are
overworked and underpaid, and complain of numerous difficulties of enforcing court judgments.
For example, court orders often fail to identify the defendant's bank account from which the
judgment is to be paid. Id.
One of the more alarming examples of the gap between the law and its implementation
was recounted by the current president of the Supreme Economic Court. In late 1995, a court
order was sent to the Central Bank of Russia, directing that certain funds from a defendant's
account be transferred in order to enforce judgment against the defendant. The Central Bank
revoked the order. As Justice Iakovlev put it, the defendant was effectively given the option
of either paying the judgment or throwing it in the garbage. Iakov Shestopal, Novie Vekhi,
Novie i Starie Problemy Arbitrazhnovo Suda [New Landmarks, New and Old Problems of the
Economic Court], ZAKON, 1996, No. 5, at 112, 114 (interview with Venyamin takovlev, Chief
Judge of Russia's Supreme Economic Court).
154. As David Chamy has argued, although contracts may provide for legal sanctions for
breach, extralegal sanctions may also be necessary where legal sanctions are ineffective to
induce performance. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
HARV. L. REV. 373, 394 (1990). These extralegal sanctions may include the loss of an asset
under the control of the other party (a "bond"), loss of reputation, or psychic or social loss. Id.
at 392-93. For example, the New York Diamond Dealers Club (DDC), a diamond exchange,
typically resolves disputes that arise between its members through an arbitration board'set up
by the exchange. See Bernstein, supra note 118, 124-26. Although decisions of the DDC
arbitration board may be confirmed in court under New York law, in practice arbitration
decisions are rarely judicially enforced, since the extralegal sanctions provided under DDC rules
are a sufficient, and often a more effective, deterrent. Id. at 129-30.
Another example of how the threat of social loss may act as an extralegal sanction is that
of the Korean "kye," a type of rotating credit group among Korean immigrants and their
families where a small number of people pool their money, enabling the members to borrow
or save. See Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
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Russian banking community appears to account for the success of the
arbitration sponsored by the Association of Russian Banks.' In addition,
the (now defunct) MCE rules relied on extralegal enforcement mecha-
nisms to induce compliance with the arbitration decisions of its tribunal.
Under the MCE rules, if a party failed to comply with an arbitration
decision, notice of such noncompliance was issued to members of the
exchange as well as to those doing business on the exchange. 5 6 And if
the offending party was a member of the exchange, noncompliance with
an arbitration decision could result in sanctions. 57 To the extent that
arbitration decisions are enforceable without resort to a court order,
arbitration presents practical advantages over litigation. 5 '
To summarize, in spite of the many domestic arbitration tribunals that
have been established in Russia during recent years, these tribunals are
seldom utilized by Russian businessmen. This may be true in part because
of the enforcement powers of economic courts and the provisions of the
Arbitration Regulation that allow for economic court interference in the
arbitration process, factors that make arbitration potentially susceptible to
the same practical problems that hinder adjudication. This author would
suggest, however, that a more serious impediment to the further
development of domestic arbitration in Russia is the mindset of many
Russians who seem to prefer the imprimatur of even an incompetent and
corrupt court decision to an arbitral award rendered by highly experienced
specialists chosen by the parties. As to legal developments relating to
arbitration, the law on arbitration that is currently pending in the Russian
government ideally should treat domestic and international arbitration
similarly. Most significantly, any new legislation on arbitration should
eliminate the substantive basis for economic court review of arbitration
decisions so as to eliminate the scope for governmental interference in the
arbitration process and enhance the independence of domestic arbitration.
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 168-71 (1996). Breach (such as failure
to make timely payments to the pot) result in extralegal sanctions including criticism and social
ostracism. Since immigrant groups suffer discrimination from outsiders, ostracism from the
group in turn leads to "isolation, loss of status, loss of security and economic deprivation." id.
at 169-70.
155. See Kostin interview, supra note 108.
156. MCE rules, supra note 125, at 188, §§26.4.1.1, 26.4.2.
l'57. Id. §26.4.1.2.
158. Bernstein has written on the substantive and procedural advantages of arbitration over
adjudication in the diamond industry in the United States, including arbitration's relative speed,
economy and secrecy in comparison with court litigation. Bernstein, supra note 118, at 148-51.
Advantages of arbitration in Russia's context are discussed below. See infra notes 234-40 and
accompanying text.
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III. SOCIAL AND HISTORIC FACTORS HINDERING REFORM
A. Limitations
In spite of the transformation of the institution of state arbitrazh into
economic courts and the other legal reforms discussed in the previous
sections, many have observed that legal protections of even basic contract
and property rights are extremely weak in Russia. 159 Although the pace
of legal and economic reform in Russia over the past six years or so has
been breathtaking, it would be naive to expect that formal changes of
such magnitude would be accompanied by similarly rapid changes in
social attitudes or in the mindset of the former Soviet bureaucratic
apparatus. As one Soviet scholar remarked in 1989, definitively curing
the ills of the Soviet legal and economic system (especially those of state
arbitrazh) will require at least a quarter of a century.' 6°
Arguably, therefore, the most significant impediments to meaningful
reform in Russia are rooted in Russia's tradition, including its roughly
seventy-year history as a planned economy. Discussed below are three as-
pects of this tradition that hinder any effort to protect economic rights: a
chaotic legal environment combined with a history of distrust of the law
and legal institutions, pervasive corruption of government officials and a
lack of qualified judges trained in the law of a market economy.
1. Legal Chaos
The relative lawlessness that has characterized the Russian economy
during its conversion to market exists at two levels: first, at the level of
organized crime and second, less obvious but more pervasive, at the level
of moral ambiguity that permeates the Russian business environment.
As to the criminalization of the market, Anders Aslund cites the rise
in crime in Russia during the 1990s as the most worrisome recent
159. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & THANE GUSTAFSON, RUSSIA 2010 AND WHAT IT MEANS
FOR THE WORLD 104 (1993). Mark'Mobius (the-manager of Templeton, a company that has
set up a mutual fund investing in Russia) advises investors not to "even think about getting
justice in a Russian court." Elif Kaban, Russian Courts Akin to Comic Theatre, THE OTTdwA
CITIZEN, May 27, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Library.
Effecting legal reform is a stated priority of the newly-elected Yeltsin government. After
Anatoly Chubais was recently appointed by President Yeltsin to serve as his chief of staff,
Chubais (who has achieved fame and notoriety in the past as creator of Russia's privatization
program) publicly stated that among his initial tasks in his new post would be to "strengthen
the judiciary." Matt Bivens, Yeltsin Appoints Chubais to Head Staff, Moscow TIMES, July 16,
1996, at 1.
160. Kallistratova, supra note 22, at 41 (citing Lunni landshaft [Lunar Landscape],
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Feb. 8, 1989).
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development threatening the liberalization of the country's economy. 16'
Although a comprehensive discussion of organized crime is beyond the
scope of this article, 162 a description of organized crime's involvement in
the privatization process illustrates how the spread of organized crime in
Russia undermines the development of a rule of law culture. Observers
have criticized the voucher privatization program,163 for example, because
it enabled organized crime groups (with the apparent cooperation of
government authorities) illegally to acquire control of a significant
percentage of enterprises undergoing privatization. These illegal methods
include producing counterfeit vouchers, failing to cancel vouchers (thus
allowing the holders to acquire additional property) and rigging voucher
auctions to ensure the desired result.'64 A local press report describes how
criminal groups in Russia have controlled privatization auctions that were
supposed to be open to the public:
Before a public auction begins, the information is conveyed to
everyone that an 'authority' is interested in this piece of property,
and that if anyone take [sic] the risk of competing for it, he
shouldn't complain later that he wasn't warned. Then a represen-
tative of the 'authority' appears in the hall, escorted by 10 to 20
165thugs ....
As a result of this type of activity, two-thirds of Russians asked were of
the opinion that privatization is "legalized theft," according to a poll
161. ASLUND, supra note 4, at 167.
162. For discussions of the role that organized crime has played in Russia's economy, see,
e.g., COMM'N ON SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR., CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA (briefing
on June 10, 1994, of Louise Shelley and Stephen Handelman); STEPHEN HANDELMAN,
Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya 131-206 (1995); Paul Klebnikov, Joe Stalin's Heirs,
FORBES, Sept. 27, 1993, at 124; David Remnick, The Tycoon and the Kremlin, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 20 & 27, 1995, at 118; Louise Shelley, Privatization and Crime: The Post-Soviet
Experience, 11 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 244 (1995); The Rise of the Gangster Industrial
Complex, E. EUR. INVESTMENT MAG., Fall 1993, at 102.
Ironically, observers have also pointed out the utility of organized crime in the Russian
economy as a provider of services (such as highway protection or dispute resolution) that the
state is unable to guarantee due to the weakness of the judiciary and the law enforcement
apparatus. See, e.g., Andrds Saj6, Traditions of Corruption, in CORRUrION AND DEMOCRACY:
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND CORRUPnON IN TRANSITION STATES IN EAST
CENTRAL EUROPE AND IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 43 (Duc V. Trang ed., 1994); see also
infra note 191 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (for a description of the voucher program).
164. Shelley, supra note 162, at 250.
165. Shelley, supra note 162, at 250 (citing St. Petersburg Gangsters Push for Economic
Power, CURRENT DIG. OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 19, 1994).
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conducted by the Academy of Sciences."6 Such control of economic
activity by criminal organizations breeds contempt for powerless judicial
institutions and conveys an apparent futility in obeying the law.
The moral ambiguity of Russia's economic environment is at least as
significant as the prevalence of organized crime. In part, this moral
ambiguity results from the paradox of overlegislation: in spite of the
weakness of Russia's judiciary, legislating is a subject of "feverish
concern" to those in government, since writing the law one's own way
is the means to wield power.167 In addition, laws are often vaguely word-
ed, internally inconsistent, and may contradict other legislation or regula-
tions. 16 As a result, it is difficult to conduct business in Russia without
being in technical violation of the myriad, constantly changing laws and
regulations issued by the Russian bureaucracy.
Although some areas of law (especially taxation) have been
overlegislated, other areas, such as securities regulation and official
corruption, have gone unregulated, particularly during the early years of
the transition. For example, one of the first pieces of Russian legislation
signed into law by Boris Yeltsin (then chairman of the Russian Supreme
Soviet) was the 1990 Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity. 169
The Law on Enterprises encouraged private entrepreneurship by expressly
prohibiting state interference in enterprise endeavors, "except on the
grounds established by RSFSR legislation."' 0 This encouragement of
private enterprise was particularly striking given the fact that in January
1991 (when the Law on Enterprises was passed) "speculation" still
constituted a crime under the Russian Criminal Code.'7 ' The dramatic
166. Shelley, supra note 162, at 252 (citing N. Kuznetsova, Crime in Russia: Causes and
Prevention, 2.3 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 448 (1994)).
167. YERGIN & GUSTAFSON, supra note 159, at 56; see also Kathryn Hendley, Legal
Development and Privatization in Russia: A Case Study, 8 SOVIET ECONOMY, Apr.-June 1992,
at 130, 131. The tendency to adopt hastily-drafted and internally inconsistent legislation is a
legacy of the Soviet era. Id.
168. An economic court judge for the region of Saint Petersburg complained of the
difficulty that economic court judges face interpreting vague and constantly changing laws and
regulations, particularly in the area of taxation. She commented that the legislative environment
in practice is so difficult for judges to enforce that Russian entrepreneurs who are thus able to
evade taxes and other regulations "smirk" and thank the legislators who draft the laws. Rendel,
supra note 52, at 60.
169. Zakon RSFSR 0 Predpriatiakh i Predprinimatel'skoi Deiatel'nosti [RSFSR Law on
Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity], Dec. 25, 1990, EKON. I ZH., No. 4 (Jan. 1991), at 16
[hereinafter, Law on Enterprises].
170. Id art. 20(2). This provision of the Law on Enterprises was also noted in ASLUND,
supra note 4, at 38-39.
171. Article 154 of the RSFSR Criminal Code criminalized speculation, or the "buying up
and reselling of goods or any other articles for the purpose of making a profit." UGOLOVNYI
KODEKS RSFSR [UK RSFSR][RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE], as amended on Oct. 27, 1960, trans-
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shift in official policy towards economic activity, combined with an
absence of laws regulating the market (such as laws against securities
fraud or other financial scams) enabled a number of enterprising Russians
to defraud the public of millions of rubles.
172
Perhaps the most glaring gap in Russian legislation that still has not
been closed is the absence of law regulating corruption. In spite of the
Russian Parliament's recent success in adopting a new civil code, Parlia-
ment has not managed to pass a series of pending laws intended to
regulate the activity of government officials.'73 Neither the preexisting nor
recently enacted Criminal Code,'74 for example, makes it a crime for a
Russian official to grant tax and tariff concessions to entrepreneurs in
violation of the tax and customs laws, or to confer special benefits on
favored investors in violation of privatization and foreign investment
legislation. 175
This puzzling combination of over- and under-regulation is in part a
by-product of Russian legal tradition, according to which the formal
content of the law tends to be less significant than the often selective
manner in which the law is applied and enforced in practice. This
personalized approach towards legality in Russia (driven by personal
power rather than uniform application of law) is captured in an old
lated in The Criminal Code of the RSFSR, in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 114 (William Simons
ed. & Harold Berman & James W. Spindler trans., 1980). On the enactment of a new Criminal
Code, see infra note 174. On Soviet-era criminalization of economic crime, see BERMAN,
JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 149.
"Speculation" was only partially decriminalized by legislation passed by the RSFSR
Supreme Soviet in February 1991. See Judith L. Anderson, Changing Conceptions of Economic
Crime Under Russian Law, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 451, 459-50 (discussing Zakon RSFSR 0
Deistvii na Territoriu RSFSR Zakona SSSR ot 31 Oktiabria 1990 goda 'Ob Usilenii
Otvetstvennosti za Spekulatsiu, Nezakonnuiu Torgovuiu Deiatel'nost' i za Zloupotreblenia v
Torgovle' [RSFSR Law On the Enactment on the Territory of the RSFSR the USSR Law of Oct.
31, 1990 'On the Strengthening of Responsibility for Speculation, Illegal Trade Activity and
Abuse of Trade'], Feb. 28, 1991, RoSSIISKAYA GAZETA [Ross. GAZETA], Mar. 12, 1991).
172. One of the more spectacular examples of this was the success of the notorious MMM
fund, a pyramid scheme that collapsed in the summer of 1994. The founder of MMM, Sergei
Mavrodi, bombarded Russian television with humorous advertisements featuring a down-to-
earth Russian who became a millionaire from the income earned from his investment in MMM.
See, e.g., Russia's Crumbling Financial Pyramid, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 30, 1994, at 67, 67-68.
See also Celestine Bohlen, A New Russia: Now Thrive the Swindlers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1994, at Al.
173. 0. Damaskin, Kakie Ekonomicheskie Pravonarushenia Stanoviats'a Kriminal'nymi
[Which Economic Violations Will Become Criminal], EKON. I ZH., June 1996, No. 22, at 35.
174. A new Russian Federation Criminal Code goes into effect January 1, 1997. Until that
time, Russian criminal activity has been regulated by the Soviet-era code. See UGOLOVNYI
KODEKS RF [UK RF] [RF CRIMINAL CODE], June 13, 1996, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, No. 25, item
2954.
175. Damaskin, supra note 173, at 35.
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Russian proverb: "It is not what you say but how you say it to me.' 176
Russians contrast western and Russian conceptions of legality: whereas
notions of law and power tend to be interrelated in the West, many point
out that power does not flow from the law in Russia.'
Power, rather than legal rights or economic wealth, was the pre-
dominant means of obtaining and preserving privileges under the Soviet
system. Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson describe the Soviet system
of power as one that utilizes the "whip and cake" method [metod knuta
i prianika], a method which allocated (or withheld) scarce goods and
services according to an individual's official position in the Soviet
system. 178 As to post-Soviet Russia, Yergin and Gustafson conclude that
in spite of the collapse of the Soviet system, in practice, power and
connections continue to matter more in Russia than judicial protection of
economic rights: "Political connections and the right friendships are still
the best protection for property and contracts. So long as these things
remain true, the law will remain a minor political resource, and a weak
element in the growth of a true market economy."'' 79 This dynamic is
exemplified in the Russian tendency to conduct business under the
protection of a "roof," or krysha. According to some observers, a Russian
business ultimately cannot be successful without krysha, or protection
provided by powerful political or criminal contacts: Krysha serves a dual
function in Russia: to protect against threats from organized crime groups
and to ensure favorable application of the law or access to government
benefits. 80
176. SHELLEY, supra note 18, at 149.
Another aspect to Russian legal tradition is a preference for spontaneous personal
relationships over the formality of law. Harold Berman describes the repugnance with which
Russians have regarded the law:
Many of the greatest Russians have despised the legalism of the West, where, in the
scornful words of the nineteenth-century Slavophile I.V. Kireevsky, "brothers make
contracts with brothers." They have looked to spontaneous personal and administra-
tive relationships rather than to the formality of law:...
BERMAN, JUSTICE supra note 7, at 224.
177. One Russian illustrates this difference by providing an example of how traffic
regulations are selectively applied by the notoriously corrupt Moscow traffic police:
A policeman does not stop those cars that break the rules: he stops the cars he feels
like stopping. The driver comes out with his license and a bill folded inside ....
[I]n other cases, a driver does not need to pay: he shows one ID or another and
listens to the cop's profuse apologies as one hundred and fifty miles an hour is not
a speeding violation, after all.
MATTHEW MALY, UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA 13 (1996). Maly's publication attempts to articulate
the psychology and mores of Russian society to a Western business audience.
178. YERGIN & GUSTAFSON, supra note 159, at 48-49.
179. Id. at 54.
180. MALY, supra note 177, at 37. According to Maly, the role that krysha plays in
Russian business is roughly analogous to that performed by in-house legal counsel in the West,
Fall 1996]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Russia's years as part of the Soviet system further weakened any
influence law traditionally held over social behavior, particularly in the
sphere of economic relations. First, Marxist-Leninist ideology itself
denounced "bourgeois law" as an institution that protected the dominant,
wealthy class and that Ultimately had to be overthrown." 1 Although the
Soviet state did not do away with law, law merely existed to reinforce the
power of the state and the Communist Party. 182 In addition, since the
Soviet system outlawed essentially all private economic activity, 183 Soviet
law itself "normatively constructed" a relatively large sphere of activity
that became part of the informal economy. 184 The relative ineffectiveness
of the official economy necessitated resort to barter and other informal
transactions that, although often formally illegal, were utilized extensively
in order to cope with the realities of the Soviet system. The Soviet
economy, for example, was characterized by widespread resort to infor-
mal channelling of state goods and services acquired by abuse of office.185
These informal arrangements, adopted to survive the severity of the
planned economy, over time legitimized within Soviet society a broad
range of conduct that violated the law but was not perceived as morally
wrong. Stanislaw Pomorski and George Ginsburgs observed how many
in Soviet society perceived state property not as "communal" but as alien
property, such that appropriating state property became an ordinary way
of earning a living and was not considered to constitute "deviant" behav-
although Maly also euphemistically observes that a Russian krysha is in other respects "a bit
different" than a typical western law firm. Id.
181. Both Marx and Lenin wrote that bourgeois law purports to be equal but in fact
perpetuates inequality. An early Soviet jurist attributed the following statement to Lenin
"[e]very sort of law is the application of a like scale to different persons who in reality are not
alike and are not equal to each other; accordingly 'equal law' is a violation of equality and an
injustice." M.A. REISNER, LAW, OUR LAW, FOREIGN LAW, GENERAL LAW (1925), translated
in HUGH W. BABB, SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 83, 106 (1951). Given the inherent inequality
of bourgeois law, Marx predicted that bourgeois law would be conquered in the "highest phase"
of communist society. Id. at 107.
182. See, e.g., BERMAt4, JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 64; loffe, supra note 7, at 1625
(observing that Soviet law is successful in "strongly securting] and vigilantly guard[ing] that
state's economic monopoly.").
183. See supra note 171 (describing the Soviet-era crime of "speculation") and sources
cited therein.
184. See Maria Los, From Underground to Legitimacy: The Normative Dilemmas of Post-
Communist Marketization, in PRIVATIZATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN POST-SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES 111, 111-12 (Bruno Dallago et al. eds., 1992). The informal transactions that Los
describes were typical not only of the Soviet system but of planned economies generally.
185. The exchange of favors through granting access to goods and services has been
described as a "salient feature" of the Soviet economy. Id. at 115 (quoting Gregory Grossman,
Informal Personal Incomes and Outlays of the Soviet Urban Population, in THE INFORMAL
ECONOMY 150, 154 (A. Portes et al. eds., 1989)).
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ior.1 16 Soviets who otherwise considered themselves honest citizens
"evince[d] no inhibitions against stealing socialist property."' 18 7
Related to Russians' views on legality are popular perceptions of the
judiciary's inability to enforce laws and protect rights. The impotence of
Soviet state arbitrazh in addressing the economic ills of the Soviet
planned economy 8' merely strengthened prevailing attitudes regarding the
relative irrelevance of law and legal institutions and their ability to protect
rights.' 9
The net result of these factors for the legal culture of Russian busi-
ness today is what one western observer termed a "shadowland of legal
chaos. ' ' 9° Given the country's history and traditions, it should not have
been a surprise that when Soviet economic law began to introduce market
principles, the entrepreneurs who first took advantage of market liberal-
ization were, or maintained close ties with, organized crime groups. Nor
should it be be surprising if Russians fail to comply with laws regulating
economic activity. Thus, the prevailing legal culture in Russia impedes
the perceived and actual effectiveness of economic courts in protecting
property and contract rights.
It should also be noted in this context that criminal groups in Russia
function to enforce legal rules and resolve economic disputes.' 91 One of
the ironies of Russian organized crime is that criminal groups have long
governed themselves according to internal criminal "laws." Those who
rule the criminal world are known as "thieves-in-law" [vory v zakone],' 92
186. Stanislaw Pomorski & George Ginsburgs, Enforcement of Law and the Second
Economy, 13 (1980) (Kennan Inst. for Advanced Russian Studies Occasional Paper No. 118).
187. Id. at 12.
188. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
189. Kathryn Hendley found that Soviet enterprise managers not only did not trust
arbitrazh judges, but they also dismissed arbitrazh as "pointless" in light of the power wielded
over arbitrazh by Soviet government ministries and the Communist party. Hendley, supra note
141, at 42.
190. Remnick describes the effects of this chaos on business culture in Russia: "Ask a
banker, a politician, and a human-rights worker whether this or that businessman is honest, and
they all give the same answer: In the standard sense of the word, honesty does
not--cannot--exist in Russian business today." Remnick, supra note 162, at 128.
191. In their proposal for a "self-enforcing" model of corporate law, Bernard Black and
Reinier Kraakman argue that a corporate law that defines norms clearly and in a manner that
participants regard as reasonable can be effective even if enforced by resort to extralegal means,
such as violence. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911, 1939-43 (1996). Black and Kraakman base their analytic model
on a model statute that they assisted in drafting for the Russian Federation and that formed the
basis for the Russian joint-stock company law. In fact, Black and Kraakman cite to the Russian
example, where "extralegal enforcement of norms of business conduct already occurs to some
extent." Id. at 1941 n.59 (citing Michael Specter, Survival of the Fittest, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 17,
1995, (Magazine), at 66 (describing the criminal world's use of razborka)).
192. For a description of the historical development in Russia of thieves-in-law and the
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and they resolve disputes between criminals (or between businesses
protected by them) through a procedure known as a "sorting out"
[razborka]. As one Russian described the razborka procedure, it may
involve powerful bankers appointing a "barely literate," retired ex-convict
to resolve a dispute according to the traditional rules followed in the
criminal world.193 Although often violent, a razborka may resemble a
western-style negotiation session where each side brings its attorney and
the parties follow the Russian -Code of Civil Procedure. 94 At times,
criminal groups may even adjudicate a dispute in economic court, not for
purposes of marshalling the enforcement powers of the state, but rather
to obtain an authoritative application of Russian law to the facts at
hand. 95 The prevalence of the razborka indicates that extralegal institu-
tions of dispute resolution are perceived by some Russians to be superior
to the state, thus reinforcing the perceived ineffectiveness of the judiciary
in Russia.
2. Independence of Judges
Russian government officials have a reputation for corruption that
dates back at least to the nineteenth century. 196 Recent anecdotal evidence
suggests that economic court judges, like government officials generally,
are not immune from outside influence,' 97 although in some cases judges
may be influenced less by bribes than by fear of retribution.
During the Soviet era, the influence that Communist Party officials
wielded over the judiciary was commonly referred to as "telephone
justice" [telefonnoe pravo]. Even when judges were vested with the
world they rule [the vorovskoi mir), see HANDELMAN, supra note 162, at 30-43.
193. MALY, supra note 177, at 76; See also ASLUND, supra note 4, at 170 ("as long as the
Russian legal system is too weak to assure the collection of payments due, people in business
need to resort to strong-arm methods to exact payments.").
194. According to Stas, a Russian who is part of the criminal underworld, it is now
considered tasteless to arrive at a razborka dressed in the traditional running suit and sneakers.
Alex Bratersky, Rumble Fashion Ready-to-Wear, Moscow TIMES, June 14, 1996, at 20. As Stas
puts it, "[iut is now time to dress as a civilized person because most of the things [sic] we
discuss in negotiations." Id.
195. Maximovitch interview, supra note 86.
196. See Saj6, supra note 162, at 43 (quoting an 1850's report to the Russian Czar on the
prevalence of corruption in the country). For an economic analysis of corruption in economies
such as post-communist Russia, see Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J.
ECON. 599 (1993).
197. Of course, any legal system may be subject to outside influence. For an excellent
discussion of how politics may undermine judicial independence in death penalty sentencing
in the United States, see Stephen B. Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.
L. REv. 759 (1995).
[Vol. 18:59
Economic Disputes in Russia's Market Economy
formal power to rule on the legality of bureaucratic decisions, in practice
judges often feared to do so. John Quigley recounts an anecdote which
illustrates the influence that Soviet government officials held over judges.
When one courageous judge struck down as illegal the decision of a
local government committee, the committee refused to comply. The
judge later informed the committee that if it did not comply with the
court order within five days, it would be subject to a fine. A committee
official called the judge and the chief judge to his office for a meeting at
which he warned of the committee's displeasure and that the committee
and the Party would "draw the appropriate conclusions." The trial judge
was reduced to tears and the decision was reversed. 98
In spite of the adoption of the Russian Constitution and federal
legislation designed to ensure the independence of the judiciary,'99
observers still comment on the susceptibility of judges to bribery and
coercion.2" In part, this susceptibility stems from the continued poor
economic and social condition of Russian judges. One of Boris Yeltsin's
legal advisers concluded in 1994 that, in spite of the lip service paid in
the Russian press to the importance of an independent judiciary, "in
reality, the prestige and power of the courts has remained extremely
low." He attributes the preponderence of female judges in Russia to the
relatively low prestige attached to judicial positions.201
Arguably, economic courts are even more susceptible to outside
pressure in Russia's current economic environment than was the case
with arbitrazh under the Soviet system, since parties now have a
meaningful stake in the outcome of economic disputes. It has been
observed, for example, that during the Soviet era, state arbitrators were
generally more "autonomous" and likely to resolve cases by resort to
legal rules than Soviet judges, because the Communist Party interfered
198. Quigley, supra note 57, at 62-63 (citing Borodin, Kogda sud'ia plachet [When a
Judge Cries], OGONEK, Feb. 11-18, 1989, No. 7, at 16).
199. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. The reforms are designed to promote
judicial independence by providing for federal (as opposed to local) government financing,
immunity from prosecution, life tenure and adequate salaries. See Law on Judges, supra note
57, arts. 9, 11.
200. One disillusioned lawyer sent a letter to the editor of Rossiiskaya Gazeta, complain-
ing of a suit brought in Krasnodar, which the Krasnodar regional economic court decided only
after resort to bribes, "telephone justice," and other informal contacts (the decision was
eventually reversed by the Supreme Economic Court). See "Na spravedlivosti ne ekonomiat"
[One Does not Economize on Justice] [Vitalii Kil'dishov, Letter to the Editor], Ross. GAZETA,
Feb. 22, 1996, at 5.
201. Mikhail Paleev, The Establishment of an Independent Judiciary in Russia, 1 PARKER
SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 647, 650 (1994).
For an account by an economic court judge of the shabby work environment and the
meagre pay for which judges work and how such conditions make judges susceptible to
corruption, see Rendel, supra note 52, at 60.
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less frequently in arbitrazh decisions than it did in criminal or other
politically sensitive cases.202 Although the susceptibility of economic
court judges to Communist Party pressure may no longer exist, there still
remains to some extent the potential for judicial influence by local
political officials who control aspects of judges' livelihood, such as
access to housing. Perhaps more significantly, economic court judges
have become increasingly susceptible to threats from organized crime
groups. 0 3 The chairman of the Supreme Economic Court recounted how
increased stakes in economic disputes has meant greater susceptibility of
economic court judges to coercion and other forms of influence. He
reported, for example, how a female judge in Novosibirsk was once
visited in her office by a party to a pending dispute, who threatened that
he could apply "any means of influence" on her.2' Criminal elements
have resorted to a variety of methods to intimidate judges. Reflecting this
new threat to judicial independence, the Law on Judges was amended in
1995 to enable judges to own and carry firearms. °5
3. Competence of Judges
A final factor impeding the effectiveness of legal reform in Russia is
the competence of judges to implement the law. This is in large part a
pragmatic problem stemming from the lack of judicial personnel trained
in the legal principles of a market-oriented system. When the system of
Soviet state arbitrazh was overhauled in 1991, most of the judges
appointed to the economic courts had served as arbitrators under the
Soviet system. These judges are expected not only to keep up with the
mass of evolving commercial legislation in Russia (including taxation
and bankruptcy law, as there are no specialized courts in these areas as
of yet), but also to reorient themselves from a socialist to a market
economy-in most cases without the assistance of computerized research,
a comprehensive system of published laws, word processors or even a
photocopy machine.2' 6 Anecdotal evidence suggests that a number of
202. SHELLEY, supra note 18, at 71.
203. Louise Shelley concluded in 1995 that the intimidation of judges by "gangster
capitalists," along with the corruption of law enforcement, has thwarted the development of a
rule of law society in Russia. Shelley, supra note 162, at 254.
204. Iakov Shestopal, Pervyi god-pervye itogi (First Year-First Steps], ZAKON, 1993,
No. 5, at 45 (interview with Venyamin Iakovlev, Chief Judge of Russia's Supreme Economic
Court).
205. Law on Amending Status of Judges, supra note 57, art. 9(2).
206. Robert Bayer of the Rule of Law consortium reported on the conditions under which
Ukrainian lawyers operate since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He found that trial judges
typically do not make independent decisions on the commercial disputes before them; rather,
they telephone the senior court and request guidance. Among the factors that hinder trial court
[Vol. 18:59
Fall 1996] Economic Disputes in Russia's Market Economy 103
economic court judges are less knowledgeable about the law than the
Russian brokerage firm parties appearing before them. In one case
reported in the press, the Russian brokerage firm Troika Dialog brought
an action in economic court against the First Voucher investment fund,
alleging that First Voucher breached its obligation to sell a block of
shares. The trial judge continuously interrupted the trial to consult a
Soviet-era law book. Finally, the judge ruled that the court lacked
expertise to resolve the dispute and decided to bring in specialists from
the Central Bank instead.207 In another case, a Russian lawyer represent-
ing a foreign client in economic court wasted an entire day of trial
attempting to explain to the judge what it means to utilize an "escrow ac-
count.
,2 08
Observers have also complained of the inaccuracy and carelessness
of opinions issued by economic court judges. An economic court judge
from the Vologodskyi region was so disgusted with the quality of
judicial decision-drafting that he published a law journal article on the
subject, complaining that courts fail to devote sufficient attention to the
thorough preparation and drafting of opinions.' Many judges, for
example, fail to identify parties and witnesses clearly or to spell out the
legal basis for decisions rendered. Other transgressions include the use of
slang, run-on sentences, and an excess of typographical errors.210 A
number of judges even utilize the pre-printed judgment forms of Soviet
independence includes the simple fact that trial court judges lack access to current legislation
and regulations:
Regional Commercial Courts receive a single copy of a new law or regulation and
most have no capacity to duplicate and distribute it. Conscientious judges subscribe
to the official legal gazette, and then clip and paste to obtain a copy of the text of
current legislation .... Such compilation of laws and regulations takes considerable
time and dedication.
Robert Bayer, Judicial Process and Ukraine's Commercial Courts, R. OF L. CONSORTIUM
NEWSL., July-Aug. 1995, at 14, 15-16 (on file with author). Bayer also reports that many
decisions are handwritten due to the shortage of typewriters. Id. at 16. Russian courts face the
same types of constraints as those described in Bayer's study. Russian press recently reported
that regional courts in the region [oblast] of Tver are threatened with closure due to lack of
funds for such basic necessities as paper. Regional Courts Threatened with Closure, MONITOR,
Sept. 20, 1996 (citing INTERFAX, Sept. 18, 1996), available online from Jamestown Founda-
tion. To subscribe send e-mail message to listserv@peach.ease.lsoft.com with text: subscribe
jamestown-I [your name]. See also Rendel, supra note 52, at 60 (discussing the need for word
processors and other material needs of the Russian economic courts).
207. Kaban, supra note 159.
208. Interview with Natalya Artemyeva, in Moscow, Russ. (May 25, 1996) (Professor of
Civil Law at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations).
209. N. Materov, 0 Kul'ture Sudebnovo Reshenia [On Standards for Judicial Decisions]
Vestn. Vysh. Arb. Suda RF, 1995, No. 1, at 134.
210. Id
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state arbitrazh, crossing out the names and phrases that no longer ap-
ply.
211
As to the substantive quality of judicial decisions, a legacy of the
Soviet era is the tendency of state arbitrazh to render carelessly drafted,
sparse opinions that failed to set forth detailed legal analysis.1 2 The
discussion above indicates a post-Soviet continuation of this tradition;
indeed, even decisions of the Supreme Economic Court follow a rigid
formula, setting forth the procedural history of the case, the issue pre-
sented, and a citation to the legal rule supporting the decision, generally
without elaboration of statutory interpretation or policy implications.
Decisions of the Supreme Economic Court have occasionally been
challenged for contradicting controlling law. For instance, a Russian
lawyer recently published a letter to the president of Russian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry in the Russian financial press, questioning the
correctness of a number of commercial decisions issued by the Supreme
Economic Court.2" 3 In response to the letter, the president cited the
benefits of commercial arbitration as an attractive alternative for re-
solving economic disputes. 24
The above examples highlight the significant practical limitations that
economic court judges face. They also illustrate how judicial institutions
in practice may actually undermine the development of a rule of law
culture in Russia by reinforcing skepticism of the law's effectiveness in
protecting economic rights.
211. Id.
212. Pomorski, supra note 7, at 101.
213. V Sashchitu Predprinimatelei, [In Defense of Entrepreneurs] [Letter to S. Smirnov,
President of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry from M. Lusnikov], EKON. I ZH.,
June 1996, No. 25, at'25 [hereinafter In Defense of Entrepreneurs].
One of the cases cited in'the letter, for example, involved the validity of a contract for the
sale of assets from the Komi government property fund to "Konsha," a cooperative engaged
in the breeding of cattle. Pursuant to the contract, Konsha paid a significant sum to the
property fund to acquire ownership over the assets. However, 'when the Supreme Economic
Court declared the contract invalid, it did not order restitution of the funds paid, on the
rationale that Konsha was still able to utilize the property under a lease [arenda] contract that
it had previously concluded. Postanovlenie No. 38-874-95 Presidium Vyshevo Arbitrazhnovo
Suda RF [Ruling No. 38-874-95 of the Presidium of the RF Supreme Economic Court], Sept.
12, 1995, published in Vestnik Vyshevo Arbitrazhnovo Suda RF, 1995, No. 12, at 62. (For an
explanation of the concept of arenda, see supra note 46.) The author of the letter points out
that the Court's decision violates Article 167 of the Russian Civil Code, which requires that
the parties to an invalid contract be returned to their pre-contract position. Such restitution was
necessary, since Konsha's right to utilize the property under the arenda contract is not the
economic equivalent of acquiring ownership. In Defense of Entrepreneurs, supra.
214. Note, however, that the case involving Konsha cited above involved a privatization
transaction with a government property fund and therefore would not be arbitrable under the
Arbitration Regulation. As to what constitutes an arbitrable dispute, see supra note 114.
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B. Consequences
Even if Russia has a weak judiciary and legal culture, one may
question the extent to which these factors adversely affect Russia's
evolving market economy. To a degree, Russia's market will continue to
develop without regard to the reliability of its legal institutions. Over
thirty years ago, Stewart Macaulay demonstrated how American busi-
nesses typically do not resort to legal sanctions to resolve disputes.215
Evidence shows that "deals march on" in Russia, regardless of whether
the contracts that structure these deals are enforceable in practice.216
There is a substantial body of literature that considers the implications
of weak judicial institutions for contracting behavior and economic
development.217 For example, parties can secure performance of a con-
215. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study f 28
AM, Soc. REV. 55 (1963). Macaulay surveyed Wisconsin business and found that many
exchanges reflected little or no planning with regard to legal sanctions and the effect of breach
of contract. For example, although requirements contracts were of doubtful enforceability under
Wisconsin law, a number of businessmen who were interviewed reported that their firms
regularly utilized requirements contracts. Id. at 60.
Macaulay himself recently questioned the necessity of embracing the rule of law in
countries such as Russia:
[E]mpirical research suggests that contract law, at best, plays a small role in
capitalist economies. These studies show that business people often do not plan with
contract law in mind, they deal in ways that preclude the formation of a legally
binding contract, and they do not assert contract rights to settle disputes.
Stewart Macaulay, Organic Transactions: Contract, Frank Lloyd Wright and the Johnson
Building, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 75, 76 (1996). Under this view, then, the weakness of legal
institutions in Russia should not significantly affect the structuring of transactions and
development of the market.
216. Louis Uchitelle, The Art of a Russian*Deal: Ad-Libbing Contract Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1992, at Al. Uchitelle reports how, as early as 1992, businessmen in Russia operated
largely on the basis of mutual benefit and trust, concluding contracts that at the time were not
formally enforceable in a Russian court.
217. Anthony Kronman refers to this condition as a "state of nature" and considers a
variety of mechanisms that parties may resort to in securing performance of contractual
obligations without resort to legal sanctions. Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and the State
of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5 (1985). See also Bernstein, supra note 118; Posner, supra
note 154; Paul Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1, 17 (1994) (arguing that conditions in post-Communist countries such as Russia
somewhat resemble a "state of nature"); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson,
Transaction-Cost]. For analyses of the interrelationship between weak judicial institutions and
economic development, see Hernando de Soto, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION
IN THE THIRD WORLD (1990); Douglass North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); Oliver E. Williamson, The Institutions and Governance of
Economic Development and Reform, WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER (1994) available in LEXIS,
World library, Allwld File [hereinafter Williamson, Institutions].
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tractual obligation by arranging for a simultaneous exchange2" 8 or by
posting collateral, 2 9 but neither method necessarily requires legal sanc-
tions for its effectiveness in inducing performance. Fear of reputation loss
similarly may act as a sufficiently vigorous deterrent to ensure perfor-
mance without resort to adjudication. There is some evidence that
reputation plays a role in strengthening the extralegal enforcement of
arbitration decisions within the banking industry and on the exchanges in
Russia.22 It is noteworthy that Russia's new Civil Code codifies a
number of "self help" remedies that operate to secure the performance of
obligations in the absence of resort to legal sanctions.22" ' Resort to extra-
legal enforcement mechanisms obviates resort to adjudication and there-
fore renders less significant the question of whether Russia is a society
governed by rule of law.222
Although Russians may conclude contracts without regard to their
enforceability, it also seems evident that an unstable legal environment
in Russia imposes economic costs on transacting by limiting the manner
in which parties may safely transact and increasing the overall risks of
transacting. In his analysis of contracting in a "state of nature," Anthony
Kronman points out that alternative, non-legal mechanisms for protecting
contract rights are limited in their effectiveness and increase the cost of
218. See Kronman, supra note 217, at 10. Russian practice on the currency exchanges
illustrates how simultaneous exchange reduces performance risk. For example, an arbitrator for
MICEX noted that disputes brought to arbitration arising out of exchange transactions dropped
significantly in the aftermath of Black Tuesday, when the ruble lost approximately one-fifth of
its value on the MICEX in the course of one day. The decrease in arbitrated disputes is
attributable to a change in MICEX rules adopted in the aftermath of Black Tuesday that elimi-
nated the existing several-day clearing period for traders, thus mandating immediate clearing
for transactions. Kostin interview, supra note 108.
219. See Kronman, supra note 217, at 15-18.
220. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, arts. 328 (suspension of return performance), 349
(satisfaction of pledged property without court proceedings in event of debtor default), 359
(retention of property in creditor's possession), 381 (retention of deposit).
222. Indeed, it was traditional during the Soviet era for parties to operate outside of the
plan and avoid submitting disputes for resolution through state arbitrazh. In her study of Soviet
lawyers, Louise Shelley drew a direct parallel between American and Soviet businessmen in
their tendency to resolve disputes without resort to courts. Indeed, if anything, the tendency to
resort to informal methods of enforcing and performing contracts was even greater in the Soviet
Union, given the limitations of the Soviet economy. SHELLEY, supra note 18, at 148. Soviet
enterprises did not have an economic incentive to bring suit, since any damages awarded were
paid into the state budget. loffe, supra note 7, at 1607. Although the state compensated for the
lack of economic incentive by imposing an affirmative obligation to bring suit, in practice
Soviet lawyers devised often creative ways of forestalling litigation. Id. The in-house lawyer
[iurisconsult] of one Soviet wine-producing enterprise reported how he typically travelled to
the location of his enterprise's purchasers in order to negotiate, and thus resolve without resort
to arbitrazh, potential claims for the delivery of substandard wine. SHELLEY, supra note 18,
at 65-66.
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transacting.223 Strengthening judicial institutions in Russia will benefit the
economy by reducing the cost of enforcing contracts, since posting
collateral and other alternative enforcement mechanisms tend to be more
costly than legal sanctions and more limited in application. 24
Evidence of market practice in Russia also indicates that entrepre-
neurs may compensate for weak centralized enforcement by structuring
exchange in a manner that reduces performance risk. Oliver Williamson
predicts that a weak judiciary in countries such as Russia induces parties
to transact either on the spot market or within a heirarchy.25 He argues
that spot-market traders can easily seek relief through substitute transac-
226tions, whereas forming a hierarchy (through vertical integration) causes
single ownership to span both sides of the transaction and eliminates the
incentive for opportunism by one side (since "joint profit maximization"
is presumed).227 Spot-market trading involves immediate exchange in a
highly liquid market which reduces the cost of breach whereas transacting
within a vertically integrated structure reduces the risk of breach.
There has been a proliferation of both types of transactions in Russia
during the post-Soviet era, which lends support to Williamson's argument
and suggests how weak judicial institutions might be affecting Russian
economic development. As to spot-market trading, the rapid expansion of
trading on Russia's stock, currency and commodities exchanges is
detailed above.22' As to hierarchies, vertical integration in Russia through
the formation of financial-industrial groups [finansovo-promyshlennye
gruppy] (FIGs) has become increasingly common as well. A FIG is a
group of Russian (and possibly foreign) companies organized around a
bank and related through cross-shareholdings, similar to the Japanese
223. Kronman, supra note 217, at 28. Kronman argues that state-sponsored enforcement
increases the security of transacting at a relatively low cost "[T]he state is ... a device for
reducing the transaction costs of exchange, one whose own marginal cost is, at the outset,
almost certainly lower than the marginal costs of alternative methods for achieving the same
end." Id. (italics omitted). On the other hand, it is also the case that, even where effective legal
sanctions exist, "an irreducible quantum of insecurity always remains." Id. at 25-26. Given the
limitations of traditional legal remedies, legal sanctions will not do away with the need for
extralegal enforcement mechanisms. Id.
224. Needless to say, resort to corruption of officials and other criminal methods of
protecting economic rights imposes significant social and economic costs on the country. See
sources cited in note 162.
225. Williamson, Institutions, supra note 217.
226. Id.
227. Williamson, Transaction-Cost, supra note 217, at 253. Kronman makes a similar
point when he discusses "union" as a mechanism for ensuring contractual performance by
"eliminat[ing] the condition of separateness that makes opposition of interests possible in the
first place." Kronman, supra note 217, at 22.
228. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
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keiretsu. 229 As of March 1996, thirty FIGs had been registered with the
Russian government; however, many others remain unregistered.23°
Although the recent growth of FIGs in Russia is attributable to a variety
of factors,23' one factor that is often cited as motivating the formation of
these groups is a desire to establish reliable sources of supply. For
example, in July 1996, a number of Russia's largest aluminum companies
teamed up with Zalog Bank, Trans World Ltd. (a British aluminum
company), and raw material producers to create a powerful new FIG,
"Siberian Aluminum." 232 One of the objectives cited in forming Siberian
Aluminum was to "control the quality and stability of [raw material]
deliveries through the creation of affiliated producers. '233 Companies that
organize into FIGs, therefore, do so at least in part because of the legal
risks inherent in contracting for inputs with outside suppliers.
A final question to consider is whether commercial arbitration offers
a viable alternative to adjudication. In some respects, commercial arbi-
tration avoids the social and practical limitations of adjudication in
Russia. Most significantly, since parties to arbitration are empowered to
choose the arbitration panel, problems of judicial independence and
competence can be mitigated.234 In addition, the relative secrecy and
229. See Simon Baker & Liam Halligan, Insider Banks Rebuild the Soviet Monopolies,
Moscow TIMES, Mar. 19,1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. For a Russian
account of the formation and activity of FIGs and a discussion of recent legislation, see E.
Torkanovskii, Finansovo-Promyshlennye Gruppy. perspektivy i problemy [Financial-Industrial
Groups: Perspectives and Problems], KHOZ. I :PVO, 1996, No. 4, at 48-58; id. No. 5, at
28-38.
Although both horizontal and vertical groupings of companies have been loosely
characterized as FIGs, the most powerful FIGs are vertically integrated. Baker & Halligan,
supra.
230. Baker & Halligan, supra note 229. Charles Blitzer, chief economist for the World
Bank in Moscow, views the development of FIGs as constituting a "major long-run concern"
in the Russian economy. Id.
231. Torkanovskii mentions rather different purposes behind setting up a FIG: some
companies group together to combine the resources of the participants, others link themselves
to a FIG in order to attract investment whereas some FIGs are formed in an effort to recreate
economic space along the lines of the former Soviet Union. Torkanovskii, supra note 229, No.
4, at 53.
232. Kirill Vishnepol'skii, Aliuminievyi Titan [Aluminum Giant], KOMMERSANT DAILY
[KoMMERS.], July 23, 1996, at 1.
233. Id. at 11. A tendency of former Soviet enterprises to organize within heirarchies was
also noted in a 1991 study by Simon Johnson and Heidi Kroll. Simon Johnson & Heidi Kroll,
Managerial Strategies for Spontaneous Privatization, 7 SOViET ECONOMY Oct.-Dec. 1991, at
281, 292-93. Johnson and Kroll cite the example of a group of Ukrainian enterprises that
united in order to establish a unified chain of supply within Ukraine. The managers of the
enterprises wanted all stages of production to be organized within the same firm, "because this
is the only way to check whether everyone complies with their supply arrangements." Id. at
293.
234. Particularly in larger cities such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg, there is a
significant number of well-qualified jurists available to arbitrate or mediate commercial disputes
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independence of arbitration tribunals from government structures may
attract Russian businesses concerned about formal compliance with tax
and other regulations. 235
A further advantage of commercial arbitration over adjudication is its
orientation towards preserving the business relationship rather than
determining winners and losers.236 Given the traditional importance
attached to informal relationships and the contempt with which many
Russians view legalism,237 arbitration may be an attractive alternative to
litigation in Russia, particularly if the Arbitration Regulation is interpreted
to allow disputes to be resolved on the basis of commercial principles and
general notions of fairness.
In light of the fact that so few disputes are brought to arbitration in
Russia in spite of these factors, 23' an argument can be made that arbi-
tration is underutilized. Underutilization can be attributed in part to
enforcement issues.239 But perhaps a more significant limitation on
for a modest fee. In fact, the fee charged by arbitration tribunals typically is less than tha(
charged by an economic court. See Grebennikov, supra note 122, at 89 (citing the example of
a dispute resolved by arbitration through the Union of Jurists at a savings of at least 45 million
rubles compared with the fees that an economic court would have required).
Outside of the major cities, finding experienced arbitrators may be a more difficult task.
An arbitrator recounted to me how he had participated in a training seminar designed to educate
Russian jurists on commercial arbitration. One participant asked about the feasibility of setting
up a tribunal in the north of Russia designed to handle international disputes, especially with
Scandinavian parties. When faced with the question of finding qualified arbitrators in that part
of the country, the participant responded that it was not imperative to find "clever" arbitrators
to serve on the tribunal. Kostin interview, supra note 108.
235. See, e.g., Grebennikov, supra note 122, at 87 (describing a dispute brought to
arbitration through the Union of Jurists involving a privatization transaction that would have
been invalidated as an illegal transaction had it been resolved in court). The dilemma is whether
it is good for Russia to encourage market activity by providing a dispute resolution mechanism(such as arbitration) that shields disputants from prosecution or invalidation of an illegal
contract. On the one hand, economic crime in Russia is rampant and needs regulation. On the
other hand, the basic goal of reforming the Soviet economy is to limit state control and
encourage party autonomy in economic transactions. Since in certain respects, Russian
economic activity is rigidly (and not always rationally) regulated, the category of technically
illegal transactions sweeps in both legitimate and illicit transactions. For example, the Russian
Ministry of Interior has reported that virtually every privatization transaction executed in Russia
has violated a Russian law or regulation. Shelley, supra note 162, at 244 (citing A. Krylov,
Organizatsionno-pravovye problemy predprinimatel'stva [Organizational-Legal Problems of
Entrepreneurship] (conference paper presented in Irkutsk, Russia,.in May 1995).
236. Oliver Williamson argues that parties tend to avoid the "transaction-rupturing"
features of litigation and turn to "third-party assistance" such as arbitration where the parties
to the dispute have invested in the business relationship and attach value to preserving it.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost, supra note 217, at 249-50. He cites Lon Fuller for the proposi-
tion that, "whereas continuity (at least completion of the contract) is presumed under the
arbitration machinery, this presumption is much weaker when litigation is employed." Id. at 238
(citing Lon Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3).
237. See supra note 176.
238. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 110, 116, 150, 153, and accompanying text.
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parties' resort to commercial arbitration is a legacy of the formalistic,
bureaucratic mentality of the Soviet system (with inordinate importance
attached to obtaining the right stamps, whether by complying with
government red-tape or by wielding power), a mentality that carries over
into the business culture of present-day Russia. In spite of its weaknesses,
the economic court system is a part of the Russian government and the
successor of the Soviet system of state arbitrazh, the government institu-
tion that has traditionally handled economic disputes.
To the extent that social mores adjust away from the bureaucratic
traditions of the Soviet system, the institution of domestic arbitration may
become more widely utilized in Russia for some of the practical reasons
outlined above. For the time being, however, neither the institution of
commercial arbitration nor Russia's .system of economic courts can be
said to'ensure stability in contractual relations or supplant krysha2' as a
means of protecting private rights.
CONCLUSION
The market-oriented reforms recently enacted in Russia have been
compared to the eighteenth-century reforms of Peter the Great.241 Peter
the Great, like Boris Yeltsin, moved quickly upon taking power to reform
Russia in the likeness of the countries of western Europe. After travelling
across Europe absorbing western ideas to apply to his own society, Peter
returned to Moscow and forcibly cut off the beards of his noblemen,
removing what in his mind symbolized Russia's superstitious tradition,
a tradition that he intended to "drag into the light of the West." 242 Peter
also imported western corporate charters (translated into Russian) for
companies that he had organized and established a stock exchange.
However, relatively few of the companies he created survived his
death. 243
Taking the analogy one step further, one could argue that Yeltsin's
reforms, like those of Peter the Great, apply western solutions that are
nonresponsive to the problems and concerns of Russian society, are only
superficial and temporary, and will be easily reversed when the political
climate changes. This line of argument has some merit, particularly with
240. For a discussion of the concept of krysha, see supra note 180 and accompanying text.
241. Michael Gershaft, The Pattern of Privatization in Russia: Trend Lines for the Future,
PRISM, August 11, 1995, available online from Jamestown Foundation. To subscribe send e-
mail message to listserv@peach.ease.lsoft.com with text: subscribe jamestown-i [your name].
242. HE NR TRoYAT, PETER THE GREAT 113 (Joan Pinzham trans., 1987).
243. Gershaft, supra note 241.
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respect to legal reform. Reform of the dispute resolution system in Russia
requires reorientation of the court system from the bottom up as well as
change in social attitudes towards law and legal institutions, neither of
which can be imposed by legislative fiat. On the other hand, I believe that
the economic and political changes that have taken place in Russia over
the past decade are more fundamental and permanent than Peter's re-
forms. Like the emancipation of the serfs by Alexander II, privatization
has altered the economic basis of Russian society and cannot be easily
reversed. However, while the formal economic structure has been recast,
it will take years for the full effects of this change to trickle down to the
Russian people. Similarly, while the legal framework for resolving
commercial disputes has been greatly modified to support Russia's new
market economy, it will take time for this new system to sink into the
mentality and business practice of Russian market players.
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APPENDIX
PUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE PLENUM OF RUSSIA'S 'SUPREME
ECONOMIC COURT (MAY 1994-MAY 1995)24
Date
5/24/94
5/25/94
9/27/94
9/28/94
12/20/94
2/28/95
Opinion No.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
41
42
43
5
244. Source: Ross. lUST., 1994, No. 10; and 1995, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 and 10.
Category, of Dispute
Civil (sale/letter of credit)
Administrative (lease)
Administrative (privatization)
Civil (enforcement of arbitration)
Administrative (rights to real property)
Civil (sale)
Administrative (lease)
Administrative (privatization)
Administrative (privatization)
Administrative (privatization)
Administrative (privatization)
Administrative (privatization)
Administrative (privatization)
Civil (loan/contract insurance)
Administrative (Central Bank)
Administrative (authority of local administration
to contract)
Administrative (privatization)
Administrative (lease)
Civil (loan/contract insurance)
Administrative (company registration)
Administrative (tax)
Civil (sale)
Civil (commercial paper/contract insurance)
Administrative (land reform)
Administrative (privatization)
Administrative (privatization)
Civil (loan)
Civil (loan)
Civil (loan)
Civil (contract insurance)
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Date
5/23/95
Opinion No.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
19
Category of Dispute
Civil (loan/guaranty)
Administrative (tax)
Administrative (privatization)
Administrative (confiscation)
Administrative (Central Bank)
Administrative (tax)
Civil (housing construction)
Administrative (lease)
Administrative (privatization)
Civil (loan/guaranty)
Administrative (company registration)
